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ABSTRACT 
Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of 
American military power.  The Limited War argument holds that the use of force 
needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy.  The Never Again 
argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be 
undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests.  The most 
influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later 
expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of 
American military power.  After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks 
bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War 
arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz’s case in favor of the limited 
use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest.  Between 
the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers.  This 
thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in 
military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE PROBLEM OF FORCE AND TRANSFORMATION 
Since the advent of modern war in the eighteenth century, makers 
of modern strategy have struggled to adjust to the changing face of politics and 
diplomacy, the transformation of societies as well as the growing power of 
weapons. In the case of the United States, this problem of ideas and 
things became especially acute in the era of limited war within the nuclear 
confrontation of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, from 1950 until 1989.  This legacy has 
considerable bearing on the character of U.S. force and statecraft in the world 
since 11 September 2001, the topic which forms the chief area of inquiry in the 
present study.  Today the United States is engaged in direct military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a host of smaller operations connected with 
the Global War on Terror (GWoT).  It is also engaged in international diplomatic 
efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran.  
While American policymakers struggle to produce effective international policy, 
the U.S. military is undergoing its Transformation process, an agenda of 
integrating technological innovations and doctrinal reforms brought about by 
improved communications capabilities, precision munitions, and networking 
theories. 
Three decades ago, the United States was one of two Cold War 
superpowers, both relatively equal in strength and representing competing 
political and economic ideology.  Today, it is the world’s sole superpower, 
providing the bulk of the military support for international stability and responsible 
for supporting many of the institutions influencing today’s globalized, free-market 
economic system.  From the end of the United States’ involvement in the 
Vietnam War (1973) until the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, the tools of American military 
power have undergone a remarkable transformation – from a state of decline to 
unrivaled strength.   
Throughout this period, American strategic thinkers have struggled to find 
a way to put the nation’s military capabilities and limitations into a policy context.  
2 
The longest-lasting and most influential attempt to do this was the 1984 
Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine during 
General Colin Powell’s term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  
During the period between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, 
however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence on American 
policymakers.  This thesis will establish a link between the rise in policymakers’ 
opinion about the utility of force and the drop in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine 
influence in the lead-up to the road to Baghdad. 
 
B. THE HISTORICAL STRUGGLE WITH THE USE OF FORCE 
The struggle to come to terms with military power and the use of force has 
plagued the American strategic community since the Republic’s beginning.  
George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address counseled the nation to “steer 
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” a message 
that advanced the idea that America’s permanent interests could only be 
protected by the judicious application of American power and resources, not by 
any sentimental attachment to ideals.1  Despite Washington’s warnings to avoid 
being drawn into the conflicts of Europe while the nation was still weak, the 
United States immediately found itself struggling to both provide security on its 
frontiers as well as to maintain its sovereign credibility on a world stage going 
through the turmoil of the French Revolution.   
In spite of relatively weak military institutions and a lowly international 
stature among the European powers during the first half of it existence (1789–
1917), the United States both projected American might around the world and 
created policies designed to establish American supremacy in the Western 
Hemisphere.2  Throughout the nineteenth century, American strategic thinkers 
                                            1
 George Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address (Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 
1999), 30.  Joseph J. Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington (New York: Random House, 
2004), 235-236. 
2 Max Boot write an account of American foreign expeditions in the nineteenth century 
beginning with the 1801 against the Barbary kingdoms and extending to the 1900 suppression of 
the Boxer Rebellion in China.  American policymakers also attempt to produce a foreign policy 
statement establishing American supremacy in the Western hemisphere beginning with the 1823 
Monroe Doctrine.  Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American 
Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002). 
3 
such as Emory Upton and Alfred Thayer Mahan attempted to come to terms with 
the technological, social, and political dimensions that the rise of nationalism and 
the Industrial age brought to this period.3  After the 1898 Spanish-American War 
and World War I (1914–1918) transformed the United States from a regional to a 
global power, the debate between isolationists and internationalists over the role 
of American military power reached a crescendo on the eve of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor (1941).4 This struggle to define the role of American power in the 
international arena took on an entirely new dimension after World War II forced 
the United States to assume leadership of Western democracies in the face of 
the Soviet Union’s stranglehold on Eastern Europe.  The Cold War strategic 
debate was also deeply affected by the development of new technologies such 
as atomic weapons and conflicts in Europe, the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, 
and throughout the Middle East.5  Each of the American military services 
struggled to come to terms with technological and doctrinal implications of the 
nuclear age – none more so than the U.S. Army, which found itself becoming 
marginalized by the other services during the years of American nuclear 
dominance (approximately from 1945 until the beginning of the Soviet build-up in 
the mid-1960s).6 
                                            
3 See Russell F. Weigley,  The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 
Strategy and Policy (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 167-191; Russell F. 
Weigley, “American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War’” in Makers of 
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 408-443; and Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval 
Historian,” in Paret, 444-477. 
4 Justin Doenecke provides and in-depth chronicle of the debate between internationalists 
and isolationists over the United States response to growing German and Imperial Japanese 
power in Europe and the Asia-Pacific in the period immediately preceding World War II.   Justin 
Doenecke,  Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
5 Lawrence Freedman provides examples of how policymakers in the United States struggled 
to come to terms with Americas’s place in the Cold War order and with nuclear strategy.  
Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); 
Also see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1991); and T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon 
Revisited : Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1998). 
6 See Michael Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” in Paret, 779-814 and 
Russell F. Weigley, The History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1984). 
4 
Changes since 1973 have proven especially turbulent as the world has 
undergone radical political, social, and technological revolution.  The 
transformation of society by human innovation has affected all aspects of the 
human experience, from the political to the social spheres.  In the past 50 years, 
military and strategic studies have also undergone a revolution brought about by 
the development of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles, as well as a 
resultant revolution in military affairs (RMA) associated with advances in 
electronics and information technology, all of which has complicated the debate 
over the use of force by increasing the potency of military instruments and 
institutions.”7   
This thesis explores how policymakers have attempted to grapple with 
these changes while at the same time trying to deal with the realities of the 
limitations of military power.   It will specifically focus on the role of the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which has been the most influential test on the use 
of force since its introduction 1984 in establishing a framework for policymakers 
to use the tools of military force.  It will also explore the role that advances in U.S. 
military doctrine and technology have played in undermining the idea there are 
limitations on military power, especially the recent Transformation agenda of 
                                            
7 Krepinevich defines military revolutions as major discontinuities “brought about by changes 
in militarily-relevant technologies, concepts of operation, methods of organization, and/or 
resources available… [that] typically advantage the strategic/operational offense [to] create 
enormous inter-temporal capabilities differentials between military regimes.”  Andrew Krepinevich, 
“Naval Strike Operations in the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 
Washington, D.C., November 1997.  Available online at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/ 
Archive/H.19971100.Navy_Strike_Operat/H.19971100.Navy_Strike_Operat.htm (12 June 2006).  
Also see Knox and Murray’s study of the history of military revolutions and RMA’s.  MacGregor 
Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).  Pierces studies the role of innovation in changing German, 
American, and Japanese operational art in the interwar years.  Terry C Pierce, Warfighting and 
Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2004); van Creveld 
writes that modern social, military, and technological forces are weakening the role of the nation 
states in international affairs.  Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical 
Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz (New York, NW: The Free Press, 1991); 
Binnendijk discusses the role of innovation and new technology in U.S. military transformation.  
Hans Binnendijk, Transforming America’s Military (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 
2003); Rethinking the Principles of War analyses whether operational art has changed due to 
modern technology.  Anthony D. Ivor, ed., Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005); and Barnett writes about how the U.S. military must adapt to new 
technological and social forces brought on by globalization.  Thomas P. M. Barnett, The 
Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Berkley 
Books, 2004). 
5 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.8    The interaction of these two opposing 
factors – a doctrine that imposes a test on the use of force to find the limits of its 
boundaries and a technical outlook that promises solutions for strategic 
dilemmas – has affected the direction of American policy by defining what 
policymakers believe is possible when they engage the tools of national power.   
When a discrepancy exists between the expectations of those means and 
the reality of policy objectives, not only do the chances that the use force or the 
threat of force will fail increases but also does the chance that the policies will 
produce unnecessary American casualties.9  Therefore, the central question of 
this thesis is whether there has been a significant change between the Ronald 
Reagan and George W. Bush administrations in how policymakers view the 
means of American military power.  If a change in perceptions has occurred 
about the nature of military force, has this changed policymakers’ views on its 
utility?  Finally, if these changes have led policymakers to view military force as 
possessing greater utility, has this led to a pursuit of greater policy objectives? 
 
C. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
 This study starts with the position that force is an accepted instrument of 
statecraft and that the primary tool of force in policy for the United States is its 
military services.10  The purpose of this thesis is to examine the link between the 
willingness of American policymakers to use forces and changes in U.S. military 
                                            
8 Some authors separate Caspar Weinberger’s Doctrine from the Powell Doctrine by 
focusing on Weinberger’s insistence on using force only for vital national interests.  However, 
Powell had a hand in writing both doctrines and throughout his service as National Security 
Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State echoed Weinberger’s 
concerns.   Ivo H. Daalder and Michale E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning the lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign 
Policy, No. 116 (Autumn, 1999): 133.  Weinberger includes a copy of his 1984 speech to the 
National Press Club.   Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the 
Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 441-442.  Powell focused on two themes drawn from 
the Weinberger Doctrine: 1.) “have a clear political objective and stick to it,” and 2.) to “use all the 
force necessary… decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives”.  Colin Powell 
and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 434. 
9 This is arguably what both Weinberger and Powell were trying to avoid by placing 
preconditions on the use of force to support policy. 
10 Craig and George write, “The proposition that force and threats of force are at times a 
necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy is part of the 
conventional wisdom of statecraft.”  Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and 
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 258. 
6 
technology and doctrines since Vietnam.  Historically, the effectiveness of military 
force radically changes when massive political, social, and technological forces 
result in military revolutions and their resultant RMA’s.11  The link between these 
changes and national power has been true since Niccolò Machiavelli began 
writing in the sixteenth century.  Since then modern strategists have tried to 
come to grips with all the political, military, and social changes affecting national 
and societal institutions.   
One of those strategists still strongly influencing the modern debate is the 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, whose theories on the link between modern 
society, war, and policy attempted to come to grips with the rise of nationalism 
brought on by the French Revolution in 1789.  Although his opus, On War, has 
influenced modern strategists from Karl Marx to Dwight Eisenhower the utility of 
Clausewitz’s theories was for many years hindered by the quality of the 
translation of his writings.12  However, Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s 1976 
edition of On War, which presented his work in a much more accessible format, 
had an immediate and widespread impact on those trying to come to grips with 
the decline of American power in the wake of the Vietnam War.13  His wide-
spread utility led to his theories serving as the foundation for discussions ranging 
from détente to the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine. 
The thrust of On War deals with Clausewitz’s attempt to get a grip on the 
transformation of the European ancien regime into modern society as a result of 
the French Revolution and the changes in the art and science of war as practiced 
by Napoleon Bonaparte.  In order to serve the dynastic interests of Prussia, 
Clausewitz bent his considerable intellect towards understanding these changes 
and attempting to determine their impact on policy in light of the expanding scope 
of war.  His struggle to find a theoretical pattern to this phenomenon has 
                                            
11 See Table 1.1. Revolutions in Military Affairs and Military Revolutions.  Knox and Murray, 
13.   
12 Eisenhower reported read the work three times while trying to come to grips with it.  
Steven Ambrose, Eisenhower: The Soldier and President (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 
1991), 40.  For Marx’s observations on Clausewitz see Paret, 265-266. 
13 The heavy influence of Clausewitz can be seen in Harry Summers, Jr.’s retrospective on 
Vietnam and national strategy.  Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the 
Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). 
7 
continued to plague subsequent strategists as they deal with the expansion and 
contraction of war brought on by social, political, military, and technological 
innovation.  Clausewitz’s continued utility stems from the fact that he clearly 
identified the link between the main elements affecting policy and the use of force 
during the new age of nationalism: the people (passion), the military (chance), 
and the government (reason), elements that remain just as evident in modern 
society and conflict. 
Throughout the century after his death, Clausewitz’s strategic successors 
struggled not only with the impact of nationalism on the institutions of society and 
war but also with the massive changes brought on by the rise of the Industrial 
Revolution and the spread of capitalism.  Two strategists who struggled with 
these phenomenons during this period were the Prussian Helmuth von Moltke 
and the American Emory Upton, both of whom attempted to grapple with the 
increasingly complex political, social, and technological nature of the changes 
affecting military institutions.14  Like their Prussian counterparts, American 
military and political leaders had to come to terms with the expansion of war 
brought on by innovations that revolutionized communication and transportation 
as well as increased lethality brought about by material improvements to the 
tools of war.15 
During the early 20th century, this trend continued as military institutions 
struggled with both the impact of brand new concepts, technologies, and 
doctrines such as the airplane, the tank, chemical warfare, strategic bombing, 
                                            
14 For an account of von Moltke’s role in adapting the Prussian military to the new 
technology of the Industrial Age, his contributions to building the institutions to manage and direct 
Prussian forces in war, and his conclusions about Germany’s strategic options at the turn of the 
century, see Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, 
and the Army in Society,” in Paret, 296-311. For Emory Upton’s role in modernizing American 
military institutions and attempts come to grips with the nature of American political and social 
culture see Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton: The American Military 
Experience (New York, NY: Arno Press, 1979). 
15 For the role of Nationalism and its effect on transforming modern Western society see 
Hagen Shulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present (Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publisher, Inc., 1996).  David Landes also discusses the cultural, technological, 
and military factors leading to the rise of Western Europe in the seventeenth through nineteenth 
centuries as result of these phenomenons.  David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: 
Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). 
8 
and mechanized maneuver warfare.16  With the arrival of nuclear weapons after 
World War II, American policymakers and the U.S. military were forced to grapple 
with concepts such as preventative war, pre-emptive attack, and massive 
retaliation, as well as ideas like deterrence and limited war.17  The military, 
especially the U.S. Army, struggled to find a place within the nuclear battlefield 
while also dealing with fighting unconventional forces in limited conflicts.18  
Today, American policymakers and the U.S. military contend with a similar 
problem, except this time they are faced with another conventional RMA– 
brought on this time by new concepts and technologies such as increased 
networking capabilities and precision bombing.  Meanwhile, the military continues 
to struggles both to transform itself in the face of this RMA as well as to fight the 
limited conflicts brought on by globalization and its counter-reaction within the 
Islamic world.19 
 
D. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The American debate about the use of force or the threat of force divides 
strategists into two camps.  The first camp, identified as the Limited War school, 
allows for the necessary use or threat of force in support of limited circumstances 
                                            
16 See Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1941,” in Paret, 
510-526; see Michael Gyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945,” in 
Paret, 527-597; see Brian Bond and Martin Alexander “Lidell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines 
of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense,” in Paret, 528-623; David MacIsaac, “Voices from the 
Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Paret.  624-647; Patrick Wright, Tank: The Progress of 
a Monstrous War Machine (New York, NY: Viking Adult, 2002); Williamson Murray, War in the Air, 
1914-1945 (New York, NY: Sterling, 1999); Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of 
Killing: the Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); 
and Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies. 
17 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1959). 
18 A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: the US Army between Korea and Vietnam 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986). 
19 Martin van Creveld writes that the role of globalization and modern technology is actually 
causing a much deeper change than just an RMA – he believes that it is breaking down the 
international system’s role for the nation-state.  Van Creveld, 192-227. 
9 
for limited objectives.20  Born out of the need to come to terms with conventional 
conflict in the nuclear age, it advances the concept that American diplomacy 
must have the option to introduce graduated levels of military force to either 
control escalation or provide a show of American commitment within conflicts.  
These limited commitments or objectives can include peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and even armed intervention to prevent humanitarian 
catastrophe.21  The other camp, identified as the Never Again school (of which 
the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is included), has been described as advancing 
the idea that policy should conform to military necessity, which calls into question 
“Clausewitz’s famous maxim that war is a continuation of policy by other means 
and that political considerations necessarily take precedence over military 
logic.”22 
This characterization may not be fair to either Clausewitz or to the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine because Clausewitz goes on to say in the same 
section that ”war in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is 
entitled to require that the trend and design of policy shall not be inconsistent 
with [the] means.”23  While the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is strongly 
prescriptive, it is flexible enough to be applied in a way that does not shackle 
American policymakers with a set of criteria as rigid as an all-or-nothing 
requirement for the exercise of American power.  This thesis examines whether it 
provides a suitable vehicle within which to answer the end-means debate 
                                            
20 Craig and George, 261-263; Blechman and Cofman Wittes write about the “all-or-nothing” 
approach to force and those who advocate limited use of force.  Barry M. Blechman and Tamara 
Cofman Wittes, “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy,” 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114, no. 1 (Spring, 1999): 2.  Bernard Briodie discusses the role 
of thermonuclear weapons in limiting the scope of war during the Cold War.  Brodie, 305-357.  
Robert Osgood focuses on the need for the United States to come to terms with the need to fight 
limited wars in the nuclear age, since the alternative is universal destruction.  Robert E. Osgood, 
Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1957).  Swaran Singh examines how technological and doctrinal advances have cause even 
limited wars, like Vietnam or the 1991 Gulf War, to no longer be small wars.  Swaran Singh, 
Limited War: The Challenge of U.S. Military Strategy (New Delhi, India: Lancer Books, 1995), 
203-211. 
21 Craig and George, 272. 
22 Ibid., 268. 
23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. 
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between those in the Limited War and Never Again schools and to ensure that 
“the means [are] never …considered in isolation from their purpose.”24 
 
E. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE EXAMINATION 
This thesis will examine how changes in conventional military technology 
and doctrines have affected American policymakers’ views on the utility and use 
of force.  While the introduction of nuclear and ballistic missile technology 
continues to have a significant impact on how policymakers and strategists look 
at the use of force, there has been a corresponding explosion of innovation in 
communications, computer, and sensor technology that has had a huge change 
in conventional weapons potential on the battlefield since 1973.  It is the result of 
the RMA associated with these non-nuclear technological and doctrinal changes 
that has led to a change in how American policymakers and strategists view the 
use of military force in limited circumstances or conflicts. 
While there is a great deal of literature about the use of force in 
international affairs, Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes suggest in their 
1999 article “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign 
Policy” that how the target of a threat of force evaluates certain criteria 
determines whether the threat or use of force will be effective.25  In their analysis, 
the character and context of the threat give it credibility.26  The targeted leader 
must balance this credibility against the degree of difficulty it requires to comply 
with the threat.27  If the cost of compliance is greater than the price the target is 
willing to pay for the status quo, then the threat has potency.28  Part of what is 
missing from Blechman and Cofman Wittes approach is the perception of the 
credibility of the threat from the standpoint of the American policymaker 
delivering it.  This thesis explores how American policymakers have viewed the 
                                            
24 Clausewitz, 87. 
25 Blechman and Cofman Wittes, 6-12. 
26 See Figure 1: Evaluation of Threats for the interaction of these enabling conditions.  Ibid., 
7. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 11. 
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credibility of U.S. military force over time.  It examines whether there has been a 
change in the perception of American military credibility and a corresponding 
willingness to use force by American policymakers.     
This thesis answers the question above by conducting an historical 
analysis of the process behind the weakening of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine 
after the 1991 Gulf War.  It also examines the course of U.S. military 
transformation since 1973 and analyzes the correlation between it and 
policymakers’ perceptions of the increased potency of force.  In order to trace 
these changes over time, the thesis focuses on five historical periods: first, the 
period immediately after the Vietnam War marking the perception of a decline in 
American power in relation to the Soviet Union; second, the period covering the 
Reagan administration (1981–1988) and Caspar Weinberger’s subsequent 
attempt to impose limitations on the use force; third, the period covering the 
George Bush administration (1989–1992) and Colin Powell’s attempts to 
reformulate the Weinberger Doctrine so it was applicable to the use of force after 
the 1991 Gulf War and fall of the Soviet Union redefined American power; fourth, 
the Clinton years (1993-2000) when the new outlook on American power 
expanded the scope in which military force could be used in pursuit of less than 
“vital” interests; and fifth, the period covering the George W. Bush presidency 
(2001-) when success in the 2001 war in Afghanistan and the potential of new 
military capabilities resulting from the Transformation process influenced 
American policymaker perceptions of the utility of force right up to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. 
Key research points include the Weinberger-Schultz debates and events 
in the first Reagan Administration (1981-1984) leading to the adoption of 
Weinberger-Powell, the role of technology innovation and information technology 
between 1973 and 2003 in driving the military’s transformation, the impact of the 
Cold War’s end on the legitimacy of force in diplomacy, and the effect of 
humanitarian and low intensity conflict on the military transformation agenda in 
the 1990’s.  This is accomplished by reviewing the memoirs of Weinberger and 
Powell, examining various accounts recording the debate over the use of force, 
12 
examining policymaker views on military capabilities and limitations, and 
reviewing government publications outlining the goals of Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
Transformation agenda.  From this, it is possible to show how American 
policymakers have changed their views on the use of force during the period 
running from the end of the Vietnam War up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  It is 
then possible to recommend whether the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine still 
remains viable in today’s post-9/11 world and if it still provides suitable criteria for 
the effective use of force in pursuing American national interests. 
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II. VIETNAM AND THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN DECLINE 
(1969–1981) 
A. COMING TO GRIPS WITH LIMITED WAR  
In Force and Statecraft, Gordon Craig and Alexander George name the 
Korean War as the seed of the debate producing the Limited War and Never 
Again arguments about the use of American military force.29  The first, articulated 
most passionately by General MacArthur during the war, advanced the idea that 
the United States could have achieved its initial goals of unifying the Korean 
Peninsula if it had used all the military options available to it (including the 
expansion of the war into China) to pursue victory.30  Anything less than a 
conclusive victory – such as the long, limited war that produced almost 34,000 
American dead and ended with an inconclusive armistice – was a waste of 
national resources and manpower.  Any crisis calling for the commitment of 
American forces in the future should either be met with decisive American force 
or avoided altogether. 
Craig and George identify a different set of lessons learned from the 
Korean War by those on the other side of the intellectual divide.  The proponents 
of the Limited War school drew the conclusion that in the age of thermonuclear 
war the consequences of unlimited warfare, especially in the face of the 
ideological alliances dividing the world at the time, could lead to disastrous 
consequences unforeseen by the pure military logic of a specific theater.31  To 
avoid the Korean War expanding beyond the limited region conflict it had become 
after the Chinese entered the war, the Truman administration reformulated the 
American strategic objectives to the more limited goal of returning the peninsula 
to status quo rather than reunification.  This course allowed the United States to 
aid South Korea, send a forceful message to the Chinese and Soviets about 
                                            
29 Craig and George, 261-262. 
30 Ibid., 261. 
31 Ibid., 261-262.  B.H. Liddell Hart argued that the threat of thermonuclear war increased 
the possibility of local conflicts because strategic bombing became less attractive.  The west 
should therefore be prepared to resort to less that total war to defend its interests.  B.H. Liddell 
Hart, Deterrence or Defense (London: Steven & Sons, 1960), 99. 
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America’s commitment to containing the spread of Communism, and avoid 
escalation that could have resulted in the conflict spilling over into Western 
Europe and beyond.   
As American policymakers dealt with crisis after crisis, from the expanding 
violence in Indochina to the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon, the debate 
between both schools of force seemed to indicate that the Limited War argument 
was winning.  Part of the reason for this came from the calculation that 
conventional air power – minus a commitment of ground forces – could not “be 
militarily decisive” and achieve American goals to contain the growing conflict in 
Indochina during the 1950’s and early 1960’s.32  The efforts of policymakers to 
minimize the commitment of American resources, contain Communist expansion 
in the region, and limit the operational objective of the war all combined to 
produce a creeping “gradualism” of American commitment that by 1965 was 
neither a limited war nor an all-out effort.33 
No one event highlights the shift in perception about the effectiveness of 
American power on the world stage more than the war in Vietnam.  By the end of 
the 1960s, the Vietnam War was consuming the nation not only in terms of 
material and manpower but also in terms of morale and spirit.  Despite increasing 
the role of American troops from guarding airbases to large-scale operations, the 
influx of massive amounts of aid to strengthen and legitimize the South 
Vietnamese government, and initiating bombing campaigns to convince the North 
Vietnamese of the futility of their aggression, the outcome of the war remained 
inconclusive throughout the decade and began seriously to disrupt the fabric of 
American society. 
 
B. DIMINISHING AMERICAN POWER? 
The nature of the war in Vietnam coincided with the military and economic 
resurgence of both allies and rivals, which - despite the absolute power conferred 
by America’s nuclear arsenal – reflected a relative decrease in overall American 
                                            
32 Craig and George, 261-262. 
33 Craig and George characterization of the growing American commitment in Vietnam as 
“gradualism.”  Ibid., 265. 
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power.  The late 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of a new international 
order as Western Europe and Japan completed their recovery from World War II 
and emerged as serious economic competitors demanding status as peers in 
decisions of collective defense.  At the same time, the Soviet Union attained 
nuclear parity with the United States accompanied by its numerical superiority in 
conventional forces while the “acceptance of the notion of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD) as the basis for superpower strategic relationships 
symbolized the end of a period of American strategic superiority.”34  The 
perception of diminished American power led to the question of how the United 
States could use force - whether in an all-out effort to win a decisive victory or in 
a restricted context to achieve limited objective – to support its policy in order to 
achieve its national interests. 
 Phil Williams, in his article “The Limits of American Power,” asserts that 
Nixon and Kissinger attempted “to minimize the impact of the decline of 
American power by co-opting both allies and adversaries into an American 
foreign policy design.”35  In effect, the Nixon administration accepted that 
American power had diminished and was now constrained by the emergence of 
the new circumstances in the international order.  However, the President and his 
National Security Advisor envisioned a grand manipulation of all the players in 
the international arena to produce a harmony of interests that relied “more on 
skillful diplomacy than on raw military or economic power” and that would still 
serve American national goals and that reduce the effort needed to secure policy 
objectives.36 
 To do this the Nixon administration embarked on a policy of détente which 
accepted the Soviet Union as a peer with a legitimate role and sphere of interest 
within the international order.  It also attempted to co-opt China as a way of 
diminishing Soviet influence within Asia and providing a countervailing force 
within the Communist ideological community that might weaken or moderate both 
                                            
34 Phil Williams, “Limits of American Power,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), vol. 63, no. 4 (Autumn, 1987): 576. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
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powers.  At the same time that the administration diplomatically engaged both of 
these strategic rivals, it also pursued a policy of greater burden-sharing with 
allies in Western Europe and Japan which both took advantage of their growing 
roles as economic powers in the developing world economy and also 
acknowledged their greater status in terms of burden-sharing and collective 
defense.  Last of all, the Nixon administration began cultivating regional powers, 
such as Iran, which were armed and sustained with advanced military weaponry 
to “act as American proxies and bear the burden of containment in specific 
regions.”37 
 The problem with this strategy was that it required a level of diplomatic 
control and finesse that neither Nixon nor Kissinger could achieve.  Instead of 
accepting its granted place as a co-operative peer, the Soviet Union began 
exercising greater efforts to destabilize susceptible governments throughout the 
Third World and stepped up support to left-wing terrorist organizations 
throughout the West.  Meanwhile, neither America’s allies nor China played their 
assigned roles, either because they could not or would not, in the manner that 
the administration intended.38  Finally, the reliance of proxies to provide regional 
containment would later suffer an almost unrecoverable blow with the fall of Iran 
to the radical Islamic followers of Ayatollah Khomeini.  Combined with the Nixon 
administration’s domestic troubles, these flaws combined to undercut any chance 
of success by Kissinger’s grand strategy.  
 The failure of the Nixon and subsequent Ford administrations’ approach to 
managing the international arena led to a completely different approach by the 
incoming Carter administration.  To Carter, the Vietnam War had “produced a 
profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system 
of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave [sic] by the covert pessimism 
of some of our leaders.”39  In his new approach to managing American foreign 
                                            
37 Williams, 576. 
38 Ibid., 577. 
39 Jimmy Carter, Commencement Address at Exercises at the University of Notre Dame, 
Indiana, 22 May, 1977.   Found online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
7552&st=Notre+Dame&st1= (15 June 2006). 
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policy, any diminishment of American economic or military strength would be 
irrelevant because under this new approach, these would no longer serve as “the 
currency of [international] influence” in the new world order.40   By changing the 
focus of the international community to emphasize the primary importance of 
human rights and moral values, the new President believed that the United 
States would be in a stronger position economically, politically, and morally than 
the Soviet Union and could exploit these strengths despite a military parity 
between the superpowers.41   
Carter believed that two of the principles he saw guiding American policy 
throughout the Cold War – beliefs that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable 
without containment and the importance of the United States maintaining 
alliances among non-Communist nations (no matter the moral cost) – were 
crumbling in the face of democratic successes in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and 
India.42  To reinforce this precedence, the United States would have to act in a 
manner that promoted the values that Carter saw as America’s primary 
strengths.  This included the downgrading of relations with regimes that failed to 
advance or share similar values.  The “moral poverty” that followed from 
supporting such regimes was part of what he saw as the failure of Vietnam, and 
the new approach to foreign policy would allow the United States to be “confident 
of our own future, [because] we are now free of that inordinate fear of 
communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that 
fear.”43 
As the Third World underwent continued turmoil and strife, Carter’s 
administration began imposing more stringent restrictions upon the use of 
American military and intelligence assets overseas and on the support provided 
to allied regimes with questionable human rights records.  His efforts coincided at 
a time with greater Congressional scrutiny over disclosures of American and 
allied abuses throughout the world – such as some of the more unsavory 
                                            
40 Williams, 577. 
41 Ibid., 578. 
42 Jimmy Carter.  Commencement Address. 
43 Ibid. 
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intelligence and military efforts in Central and South America as well as past 
operations in Vietnam and its surrounding region.  The generally poor record of 
Executive branch supervision over the course of the past decade made Carter’s 
focus on the “moral crisis” not entirely unwarranted nor without appeal to an 
exhausted American public.   
Unfortunately, “the Soviet agenda was incompatible with that of the Carter 
administration.”44  The Soviet Union still retained military parity with the United 
States as well as what appeared to be a generally robust resource and economic 
base.  It chose this time to increase its efforts to further destabilize troubled 
regimes throughout the Third World, some of which the Carter administration had 
withdrawn or drastically cut support to, allowing the Soviets to exploit the global 
instability to its geostrategic advantage.  The administration’s inability to come to 
grips with Soviet activism in Africa and the Americas, coupled with poorly 
managed policy initiatives, such as the badly handled B-1 bomber cancellation – 
left Carter open to charges of incompetence in matters of national security.  
When the Shah of Iran, who had been exposed to great criticism by the 
administration over his human rights record, fled his country while American 
embassy staff fell into the hands of Islamic extremists, Carter’s image as a poor 
custodian of American security was sealed. 
Both the Nixon and Carter administrations had proven “innovative and 
imaginative in [their] efforts to maintain American leadership in the international 
system… [and] compensate for the loss of American primacy.”45  Both had tried 
to change the focus of the international agenda by redefining America’s 
relationship with both its allies and the Soviet Union.  Both accepted the idea that 
the United States had lost power to influence the course of international politics 
as a result of both the Vietnam War and greater Soviet capabilities.  Both 
attempted to compensate the best they could under the circumstances.  
However, despite their best efforts, neither agenda to transform the mechanics of 
the international arena (as opposed to regaining American strengths) proved 
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45 Ibid., 579. 
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successful domestically or internationally.  It would be left to the next decade to 
see the emergence of two trends – one military and one political – that would 
redefine American power in terms of perception as well as reality. 
 
C. THE SEEDS OF AMERICAN RESURGENCE 
 Since the introduction of atomic weapons and the subsequent stalemate 
of the Cold War, the United States had been in a quandary regarding how to 
apply conventional power in a nuclear world.  The problem became especially 
acute after the Soviets launched Sputnik because, at least in perception, the 
shield of America’s oceans was now neutralized and a war in Europe or Asia 
could conceivably impact the continental United States.  Extending the “umbrella” 
and actually redeeming American nuclear guarantees might not only impact on 
battlefields in allied territory but also pose actual danger to American population 
centers.    
The need for a credible conventional military deterrent to supplement 
nuclear options forced American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
strategists to search for solutions to contain any conflict with Communist forces 
just short of all-out nuclear war.  Because even minor conflicts could escalate 
and affect the strategic balance in far off places, proponents of limited or indirect 
strategies, such as Liddell Hart, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Osgood, and André 
Beaufre, offered policymakers conventional and “sublimited [sic] nuclear” options 
that were less demanding than total and unlimited engagement.46   However, as 
the West attempted to implement these strategies, its experiences in Indochina, 
the Middle East, and North Africa showed that “keeping a war limited to the 
extent one desires depends on the willingness of the opponent to accept the 
limitations.”47  The American experience in Vietnam exposed this flaw in the  
 
 
                                            
46 For a summary of Bernard Brodie, B.H. Liddell Hart, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Osgood, and 
André Beaufre’s theories and strategies, see Michael Carver “Conventional Warfare in the 
Nuclear Age,” in Paret, 784-789 and Singh, 36-81. 
47 Ibid., 787. 
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Limited War argument while, at the same time, not confirming the alternative 
position, leaving strategists in the same predicament they had been struggling 
with since the Cold War began.  
For the U.S. military, the long struggle with revolutionary warfare while 
attempting conventional defense in Europe had produced an almost 
dysfunctional institution.  While the war in Vietnam had caused all the services 
problems of focus and direction, it was the Army that suffered the worst; its 
leadership would spend the rest of the 1970s attempting to reconstruct its 
mission and repair its institutions.  Part of the U.S. Army’s attempts to come to 
grips with the war was in the form of the 1982 U.S. Army War College study titled 
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, which was tasked to explain 
“what went wrong”48 in Vietnam.  The author, Colonel Harry Summers, couched 
his explanations in stilted Clausewitzian language that determined the American 
effort failed because national political leadership sent the military to fight a war 
without mobilizing public support49, marginalized or ignored its advice in favor of 
civilian analysts50, and failed to define clear and attainable objectives51. 
While its leadership struggled to understand what had gone wrong over 
the past decade, the seeds for “the most complete rearming in [U.S.] Army 
history”52 were being planted in the deserts and hills of Israel at the same 
moment American forces were withdrawing from Vietnam.  In 1973, the armies of 
Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors fought the most sophisticated war to 
date with advanced weapons from both NATO and Warsaw Pact arsenals, 
displaying to the world a lethality and destructiveness surprising to everyone.   
The impact of precision-guided munitions – anti-aircraft and anti-tank – took a toll  
 
                                            
48 The mission of the study is described in the foreword by Major General Jack N. Merritt, 
Commandant of the U.S. Army War College.  Summers, On Strategy, xii.  
49 Ibid., 11-12. 
50 Ibid., 42-43. 
51 Ibid., 149. 
52 Russell F. Weigley, The History of the United States Army, 585. 
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on both sides while the rate of material expended – about 50 percent53 – in less 
than two weeks of combat alarmed American and NATO planners facing the 
defense of Western Europe. 
During 1973-4, the Army began institutional changes that included 
separating Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), into 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Forces 
Command (FORSCOM), shifting substantial portions of support functions from 
regular units to the Reserve Component, and increasing American divisional 
strength from 13 to 16 divisions by introducing Army National Guard “roundout” 
units to supplement regular divisions during mobilization.  Meanwhile, the new 
TRADOC engaged in an in-depth study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in close 
coordination with allied militaries, especially the German Bundeswehr, and the 
U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command.  These efforts were part of a conscious 
effort by the Army’s leadership to make a “doctrinal reassessment… [to reorient 
from] infantry-airmobile warfare in Vietnam to the arena of conventional 
combined arms warfare in the theater of primary strategic concern… Western 
Europe.”54 
 In 1976, as a result of TRADOC studies, through the play of regional battle 
scenarios and by coordination with NATO allies and the other U.S. services, the 
Army released Field Manual 100-5, Operations, which outlined its new doctrine: 
Active Defense.55  This doctrine focused on the lessons of weapon lethality 
learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, recognized the importance of utilizing 
terrain, and stressed the importance of coordinating all close air, direct, and 
indirect fires.  Recognizing and accepting the fact that NATO forces would 
always operate at a numerical disadvantage, Active Defense sought the 
“substitution of firepower for manpower and the potential of [new] U.S. 
                                            
53 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army 
Doctrine 1973-1982 (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 7. 
54 Ibid., 3. 
55 Ibid. 
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weapons… for swift massing to concentrate combat power to decisively alter 
force ratios when and where [NATO forces chose].”56 
 The Active Defense prove short lived.  Soviet doctrinal changes (based on 
their analysis of NATO anti-armor capabilities), loss of the tactical reserve, 
distrust of “firepower/attrition” focus, and a fear that commanders could not 
achieve necessary levels of tactical concentration all led to an immediate 
reevaluation of the doctrine.57  By 1978, the Army was already working on new 
tactical and doctrinal ideas that built on the positive aspects of Active Defense.  
The major contribution of Active Defense was that it forced the Army to “confront 
the changed technological situation and created a close awareness of the new 
lethality of modern weapons.”58 
 In 1982, the Army released the new FM 100-5, Operations outlining the 
new AirLand Battle doctrine.  This was an outright acknowledgement that the 
“emergence of a wide range of surveillance systems, target acquisition sensors, 
and communication capabilities,” combined with the lethality of a new generation 
of weapon platforms had produced a change in the nature of the battlefield.  
Perceptions of American capabilities to project and sustain force had turned a 
corner - at least within the military.59  This newfound belief held that 
technologically and qualitatively superior American forces, through a doctrine of 
coordinated maneuver and deep attacks, could defeat a quantitatively larger 
Warsaw Pact force.60  As this change in perception about American conventional 
capabilities developed in the military, there was a comparable shift occurred 
within the political landscape that would herald a similar change in how American 
policymakers also perceived force.  
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III. NEW VISION: REAGAN AND THE WEINBERGER 
DOCTRINE (1981–1888) 
A. REAGAN’S NEW AGENDA 
Phil Williams writes that when Ronald Reagan took his Oath of Office on 
20 January 1981, he inaugurated a new American “foreign policy philosophy 
[which] represented an attempt to overcome the limits of American power largely 
by ignoring them.”61 This opinion arguably contains an element of truth.  
However, what Reagan realized was that the utility of power is both in how it is 
perceived by those who wield it as well as against whom it is wielded.  Williams’ 
observation also contains another element of truth: Reagan repeatedly referred 
to the “Vietnam syndrome” and its effect on American foreign policy and wanted 
to reverse what he saw as a self-imposed constraint on his administration’s 
ability to act.62   Like the struggle of the U.S. military to exorcise the spirit of 
Vietnam in the 1970’s, the new President clearly sought to break with what he 
perceived as his predecessors’ practices of constraining American power within 
the limitations imposed by domestic and international perceptions stemming from 
the Vietnam War. 
How the Reagan administration chose to wield American power would 
become the central point of contention between the two men charged with 
shaping the lion’s share of American foreign policy: Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz.  The question of how 
American military power could be used in the post-Vietnam era was more 
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speeches/1981/52781c.htm (16 June 2006). 
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relevant than ever because the international arena seemed especially 
threatening in the new decade.  During the 1970s, the Soviet Union had 
aggressively destabilized allied and neutral states throughout the Third World 
while the Middle East saw the rise of a new threat in the Islamic radicalism of 
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Reagan’s vision of how to meet the challenges of the new decade was 
fairly comprehensive.  In March 1981, CIA Director William Casey presented 
proposals for covert actions against a host of hostile regimes, including those in 
Nicaragua and Afghanistan.  Acting on some of these recommendations, Reagan 
authorized in the first few months of his administration a series of covert 
programs designed to diminish Soviet influence, starting in Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan, and Angola.  On 25 October 1983, combined American military 
forces, in the first large-scale American military intervention since Vietnam, 
invaded Granada and overthrew a communist-supported junta that had taken 
over the island. 
At the same time Reagan’s administration exercised the use of political, 
economic, and covert power to destabilize communist regimes, it continued the 
build up of American nuclear and conventional military capabilities begun during 
the Carter administration.  On 20 May 1982, the President signed National 
Security Decisions Directive-32 (NSDD-32) committing the United States “to 
close the gap between strategy and [conventional] capabilities” by specifically: 
improving operation capabilities of forward deployed forces; improving command, 
control, and communications (C3); providing enhanced sustainment capabilities; 
increasing power projection assets; and continuing platform modernization.63  On 
23 March 1983, he announced to the nation his decision to establish a 
comprehensive research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), aimed 
at eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles. 
The Reagan administration’s approach to the problem of declining 
American power was radically different that of either the Nixon or Carter 
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administrations.  Instead of accepting decline as inevitable and attempting to 
engineer the international system to compensate, he sought to redefine 
American power in terms of both perception as well as reality through action and 
transformation. 
 
B. SHULTZ’S ARGUMENT 
In 1981, President Regan took the helm of state from a Carter 
administration that had seen unprecedented “turmoil and instability” throughout 
the Third World – troubles that had provided the Soviet Union “unprecedented 
opportunity for [increasing] Soviet geopolitical gains.”64  It also saw the explosive 
threat of revolutionary Islam overthrow America’s strongest ally in the Middle 
East – Iran – threatening to destabilize the whole region.  In the face of Soviet 
intrigues and revolutions throughout Central and South America, Central Asia, 
and Africa and the dangers of the Khomeini’s brand of Islam in the Middle East, 
Reagan offered a starkly different vision of how American power could be applied 
to protect national interests. 
How American power would be applied during the Reagan presidency led 
very early on to serious policy clashes between both Secretaries Schultz and 
Weinberger in the face of a series of global incidents demanding American 
reaction.  The threats posed by an apparently resurgent Soviet Union, the spiral 
of violence between Communist guerillas and right-wing death squads in El 
Salvador’s civil war, the Sandinista regime’s export of revolution throughout 
Central America, the threat to Persian Gulf shipping posed by the Iran-Iraq War, 
and the consequences of the disastrous 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon all 
demanded American policymakers find a way, both to reconcile with Vietnam’s 
legacy and to come up with a consistent doctrine for the use of American power 
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and knew the limitations and constraints the administration faced; however, each 
advocated very different approaches for dealing with the international crises 
facing the nation.65 
The first position, advocated by Secretary Schultz held “the traditional, 
conventional view that a great power… must back its diplomacy… with credible 
threats of force and be willing to use military force on occasion if threats did not 
suffice.”66  His argument validated Clausewitz’s maxim that since war is a 
continuation of policy by other means, “diplomacy and force [cannot] be 
completely separated.”67  The Secretary of State, in a speech given in October 
1984, effectively argued that diplomacy without the credible sanction of force was 
ineffectual and that a policy doctrine that a priori limited the use of force would 
undermine the diplomatic interests of the United States. 
The Secretary of State’s argument held that despite the national 
preoccupation with the trauma of Vietnam, the United States would have to come 
to terms with the use of military force in less than ideal circumstance in the new 
era of both Soviet adventurism and international terror.68  There would be policy 
situations that, despite falling short of the “vital” national interest, would still call 
for either the use or threat of force by the United States so that American 
diplomatic efforts would be credible.  He also argued that restrictive criteria on 
military action like “all-out-effort” or “no-effort,” mandatory clear political and 
military objectives, and a guarantee of favorable public support would prove just 
as harmful to American interest as a “vital interest” requirement.69  Ultimately, he 
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concluded that “[t]he need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn 
automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent 
involvement.”70 
 
C. WEINBERGER’S COUNTER AND A NEW DOCTRINE 
 Shultz’s position was challenged by Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
who, like the military institution he oversaw, was both trying to come to terms with 
the specter of Vietnam and at the same time attempting to transform the 
instruments of American military power.  To Weinberger, the lessons of the Cold 
War clearly pointed to the dangers of using military force without the restraint of a 
clear political purpose.   His reading of Clausewitz focused on the second half of 
the paragraph containing the Prussian’s famous maxim – the less quoted part 
observing the importance of commanders possessing a clear understanding of 
capabilities and limits on military means used to achieve policy objectives.71 
 In his autobiography, Weinberger credits two events besides Vietnam with 
influencing his views on the application of military force in support of American 
policy.  The first event was the Carter administration’s disastrous 1979 Desert 
One raid which attempted to rescue the American hostages in Iran but ended 
with eight dead commandos and no rescue.  In Weinberger’s opinion, the 
operation failed because the force was not robust enough (specifically, it did not 
contain enough helicopters) to continue the mission after the accident.72  He 
would cite this lesson as his answer to critics’ charges that he sent too many 
troops to invade Grenada in 1983.  In fact, his final words to the commander of 
the invasion force were to “be sure we have enough strength.”73 
 The second event that strongly affected Weinberger’s views on the use of 
American armed forces to support policy was the 1983 Marine barracks bombing 
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in Beirut.  In this case, violence was spiraling out of control in Lebanon after the 
Israeli invasion in June 1982.  In September 1982, a few days after the Christian 
Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated, Christian militia forces 
massacred hundreds of unarmed Palestinian refugees at Shatila.  These events 
caused pressure to mount on the Reagan administration to “establish a 
presence” in Lebanon and to bring things under control.74  By the end of the 
month, American, French, Italian, and a small contingent of British troops had 
reestablished a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to do just that.    
The push to send American forces back into Lebanon was proposed by 
the Deputy to the National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, along with State 
Department support.  Secretary Weinberger resisted the deployment because in 
his opinion, the mission to “establish a presence” did not amount to a clear 
objective for the military forces put in harms way.75  Despite his objections, 
President Reagan believed that the situation had deteriorated to the point that 
the United States had to do something, resulting in his decision to deploy 1400 
Marines around the Beirut airport.  Over the ensuing year, Weinberger vigorously 
argued for the withdrawal of the Marines while, at the same time, the State 
Department attempted to diplomatically engineer an Israeli and Syrian pullout of 
Lebanon.    
Weinberger believed that the Marines could not facilitate a withdrawal of 
Israeli or Syrian forces because no matter what the State Department thought it 
could negotiate, neither nation was really interested in leaving Lebanon any time 
soon.76  Since the original objective for keeping the American forces in Beirut 
had been redefined from “establishing a presence” to interposing between 
withdrawing Syrian and Israelis forces without a clear commitment by either side 
to withdraw or a substantial American military effort to force a pullout, the 
objective was unachievable.  To Weinberger, the State Department’s willingness 
to leave the Marines in place and exposed them to an increasing level of violence 
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while they pursued an unachievable diplomatic solution was irresponsible.77  On 
the morning of 23 October 1983, suicide bombers drove explosive-laden trucks 
into the French and American MNF compounds, killing 58 French paratroopers 
and 241 American Marines. This tragedy and waste of life underscored the futility 
of the entire mission in Weinberger’s eyes because, despite the sacrifice of the 
Marines and paratroopers, the MNF was forced to withdraw from Lebanon 
without ever having come close to getting the Israelis or Syrians to withdraw 
despite a year-long State Department effort.78  More than any event since 
Vietnam, the Beirut bombings drove home in Weinberger the need to establish 
principles governing the use of American power while trying to achieve clearly 
defined policy goals. 
 Over the next year, Weinberger struggled to come to terms with the 
tragedy and worked to find a way to draw lessons that would serve to prevent 
what he viewed as mistakes like Lebanon and Vietnam.  A year later on 28 
November 1984, he delivered an address to the National Press Club that set out 
what he believed were principles to guide policymakers in the responsible use of 
American power to achieve national objectives.  This speech, which laid out what 
would become known as the Weinberger Doctrine, profoundly changed the 
course of the debate over the conditions in which the United States would 
employ force ever since. 
 On its face, the Weinberger Doctrine is quite simple.  It proposes six 
tenants to test the circumstances for any deployment of American military forces 
into conflict: 
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless it is in 
the nation’s vital interest or in the vital interest of our allies. 
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2. When the decision to commit troops to combat is made, it should be 
done with the purpose to win.  This means that the size of the force 
committed should be large enough to ensure victory.  
3. Any commitment of troops to combat must be to achieve clearly 
defined political and military objectives. 
4. The relationship between the objectives and the forces committed 
must be constantly monitored and adjusted as necessary with 
changing conditions. 
5. The United States should commit troops only if there is a support from 
the American people and Congress. 
6. Force should be an option of last resort.79 
As Colin Powell summed them up as “Is the national interest at stake?  If the 
answer is yes, go in, and go in to win.  Otherwise, stay out.”80 
From the tone of his autobiography, Weinberger clearly intended for the 
speech to act as a brake on what he regarded as unchecked hubris and 
irresponsible conduct on the part of members of the State Department and the 
National Security Council.  He had spent the year “[applying] his formidable 
lawyerly intellect to an analysis of when and when not to commit United States 
military forces abroad” and studying the circumstances of American military and 
policy failures from the past.81  The result was a speech laying out prohibitions 
against sending American forces into combat without policymakers meeting strict 
criteria which he believed necessary to maximize the chances of success for 
those forces once they were deployed to combat. 
In the wake of the speech and the profound impact it had on shifting the 
debate over the use of force in the favor of those advocating the Never Again 
strategy, critics of the Weinberger Doctrine point out that it undermines 
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Clausewitz’s prescription for the precedence of policy over military 
requirements.82  On the face of the prohibitive language used by Weinberger in 
delivering the speech, this charge seems true.  However, when the text of the 
Weinberger Doctrine is examined more closely, it is clear that the critics charge is 
in fact wrong. 
The Weinberger Doctrine is less about the use of force than it is about 
establishing requirements for national leadership to clarify policies and objectives 
before resorting to force.  Unlike the circumstances facing Imperial Germany at 
the end of World War I, where the General Staff allowed operational necessity 
(not grounded in a sound strategic foundations) to supersede policy, this doctrine 
still places policy as supreme over military logic.  It does, however, strongly 
establish a case for the need to articulate the link between ends and means in 
order to maximize the prospects for success in any use of force to achieve 
national objectives.   Like any doctrine, “it is authoritative but requires judgment 
in application.”83 
 
D. IMPACT OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE 
The inauguration of President Reagan marked a clear change in 
perception about the use of force by American policymakers, both in language 
and in action.  This coincided with a similar change in perception by the military 
about its capabilities that had been evolving since 1973.  The change in 
perception by both policymakers and the military signaled a radical shift from the 
previously accepted limitations and constraints that had affected both the Nixon 
and Carter administrations and the military in the wake of the Vietnam War.  In 
the face of both the resurgence of American power and the simultaneous 
advocacy by members of the administration to use it, the effect of poor ends-
means policy correlation led to the disaster in Beirut and the desire by Secretary 
Weinberger to prevent a recurrence. 
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Weinberger’s speech to the National Press Club outlining his doctrine for 
the use of force attempted to reconcile the resurgence of American power with a 
reminder of the dangers of using American service members to pursue unclear or 
unrealistic policy objectives.  The American experience in Vietnam exposed the 
flaws in pursuing limited war objectives without understanding whether an 
opponent was willing to accept those limitations.  The tragedy of the bombings in 
Lebanon showed the flaw in Shultz’s arguments about the need for diplomacy to 
be backed with credible threats of force when diplomats cannot clearly or 
realistically define achievable diplomatic objectives.  Though the language of 
Weinberger’s speech is perhaps more restrictive than necessary to make his 
point, it does present a compelling case for policy clarity that has clearly 
resounded with those debating how to reconcile democratic institutions with 
responsible use of military force.  That its language has achieved such longevity 
and widespread influence, well beyond Weinberger’s term as Secretary of 
Defense, speaks to its utility and explains why it had such a strong impact on the 









IV. THE POWELL DOCTRINE, JUST CAUSE, AND THE 1991 
GULF WAR (1989-1992) 
A. THE EDUCATION AND RISE OF COLIN POWELL 
 Caspar Weinberger’s views on force and policy would leave such an 
indelible impression on one member of his staff that this military officer would 
champion the Weinberger legacy well into two subsequent presidential 
administrations.  This officer – Colin Powell – proved so successful at influencing 
policy in the 1991 Gulf War during President George H. W. Bush’s administration 
that Weinberger’s doctrine would become known as the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine.  One of the main reasons Powell would be so successful at 
championing this doctrine through both the Bush and Clinton administrations 
would be that – more so than any other military officer of his generation – Colin 
Powell would become the consummate political Washington insider.  His ability to 
navigate the currents of Washington politics would carry him through four 
presidential administrations where he would hold vital policy position ranging 
from National Security Advisor to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
Secretary of State, almost the entire time while still in uniform. 
Before his rise to policy prominence, Colin Powell arguably received one 
of the best political educations of any military officer since Alexander Haig.  He 
began his policy education serving two and a half years in Washington, D.C., 
with the Carter administration before his meteoric rise in the Reagan 
administration.  His jobs included executive assistant to John Kester, the Special 
Assistant to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense; military 
assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense; and a short stint at the 







President Carter.  It was during this period – especially during the trauma of the 
failed 1980 Desert One rescue attempt – when Powell’s opinions about national 
policy and military force began.84 
When the Executive Branch transitioned from the Carter to the Reagan 
administration in 1981, Powell served for a short period as military assistant to 
the new Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, establishing the personal 
ties with the incoming regime that would bring him back to Washington after just 
two years “re-greening” himself back in the Army.  When he returned as a major 
general to the Pentagon in the summer of 1983, he returned as the military 
assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.  While working under him, 
especially through the 1983 invasion of Granada and during the crisis of the 
Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, Powell’s conclusions about specific policy 
outcomes echoed the views held by his boss, Weinberger.85 
 By 1984, the debates over policy and force between Secretary of State 
Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger had taken on a different tone in the 
wake of the American withdrawal from Lebanon and the success of the Granada 
invasion.  The Secretary of Defense’s arguments about use of force carried 
greater weight and by November he received permission from President Reagan 
to deliver his National Press Club policy speech outlining principles governing the 
commitment of American forces into conflict.86  Weinberger’s speech on 28 
November 1984 carefully outlined the set of tests that would become known as 
the Weinberger Doctrine.  For Powell, this event marked a milestone in his view 
on how American force could support policy.  While he admits to being worried at 
the time that the speech was “too explicit and would lead potential adversaries to 
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look for loopholes,” he states that when it became his responsibility to advise 
American presidents on committing forces, “Weinberger’s rules turned out to be a 
practical guide” that, in his opinion, “Clausewitz would have applauded.”87 
 Powell left the Pentagon to take command of V Corps in Germany in 
March 1986, just before the Iran-Contra investigations began to expose the 
administration’s clandestine and illegal arms-for-hostages deal.  However, after a 
personal call from President Reagan, Powell returned to Washington, DC in 
January 1987 as deputy to his old boss Frank Carlucci, who had been appointed 
as the new National Security Advisor at the departure of John Poindexter.  
During the next ten months, the two men would try to revitalize a demoralized 
NSC staff while in the harsh glare of the continuing Iran-Contra investigations.  
By November 1987, Caspar Weinberger resigned as a result of the lingering 
cloud of scandal and family problems; to replace him, the President tapped 
Carlucci to take over as the new Secretary of Defense.  In his place, the 
President nominated Colin Powell to assume the newly vacant position as 
National Security Advisor.  Powell’s focus during this period would rarely deal 
with use of force debates and instead be on Soviet-American issues as the 
U.S.S.R. entered the throes of its final days. 
 Powell’s work as first the deputy and later the National Security Advisor in 
the last two years of the Reagan presidency served both to build up his credibility 
in policy circles and to bring him to the attention of Vice President George Bush.   
Soon after Bush inauguration in January 1989, Powell returned to the Army, this 
time as the four-star commander of FORSCOM.  However, this command 
followed the same pattern as his earlier “re-greening” stints, lasting only until 
October, when he was appointed by President Bush as the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  It would be in this position that Powell would directly influence 
American conduct of policy through two major commitments of American military 
force: the invasion of Panama and the 1991 Gulf War. 
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B. A MILITARY RESURGENT 
Colin Powell credits the Reagan-Weinberger team for ending the long 
estrangement between the American people and their armed forces that resulted 
from the Vietnam War.88  It is true that during President Carter’s administration 
total military spending increased by 61 percent over the Ford administration – a 
sharp increase after a steady decline following the gradual American withdrawal 
from Vietnam.89  It is also true that many of the weapon platforms that became 
the backbone of the Reagan build-up were developed during the Carter years.  
However, in the face of the Iranian revolution, the subsequent rescue failure, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, continued instability throughout the Third World, 
and descriptions of the military as a “hollow force”90, public confidence in the 
military throughout Carter’s tenure remained fairly low.91  On the other hand, the 
Reagan military build-up increased military spending by over 90 percent92 – 
rapidly paying for the modernization of military equipment as well as increasing 
incentives to enlistment resulting in a better quality of personnel entering the 
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services.93  Both of these investments paid political dividends in terms of 
increased American public confidence in their military as an institution.94   
This increased confidence in the military’s capabilities was not just the 
result of the billions of dollars being pumped into programs like the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) and the M-1 Abrams tank.  While better weapons and 
higher quality personnel mattered a great deal, both the Defense Department 
and the services were making very real doctrinal and organizational changes 
focusing on incorporating both new material and better networking capabilities as 
well as reducing redundancy and making the services more interoperable.  Part 
of the impetus for change was driven by Congresses’ Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986, which attempted to reduce inter-service rivalry – something that many 
blamed for the failure of the Desert One mission and for the problems 
experienced during the Grenada invasion95 – in order to create an environment 
                                            
93 In 1980, 54.3% of enlisted soldiers joining the Army in FY 1980 had high school diplomas 
(a drop from 64.1% in FY 1979).  Department of the Army, Department of the Army Historical 
Summary: FY 1980 (Washington, D.C.,: Department of Defense, 1980), 76. Available at http:// 
www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1980/ch05.htm#b2 (16 June 2006). However, by the end of 
1984, the number of high school graduates had risen to 90.8%.  Department of the Army, 
Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1984 (Washington, D.C.,: Department of 
Defense, 1984), 167. Available at http://www. army.mil/cmh-pg/books/DAHSUM/1984/ch07 
.htm#t1 (16 June 2006).  This high quality remained until the end of the Reagan administration, 
with the 89.3% of new soldiers graduating from high school.  Department of the Army, 
Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1988 (Washington, D.C.,: Department of 
Defense, 1984), 14.  Available at http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1988/ ch02.htm#b2 
(16 June 2006). 
94 Public confidence in the U.S. military peaked during the first Reagan administration in 
1984 at 45% of the public showing “a great deal of confidence” in it – a 17% jump from the end of 
the Carter administration.  In the wake of the Marine withdrawal from Lebanon and the Iran-
Contra scandals, public support again dropped to a s low as 33% during Reagan’s second term, 
but never hit the low levels of the Carter administration.  Harris Poll Historical Data.   Available 
online at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=646 (16 June 2006). 
95 Powell describes the frustrations of Colonel Charles Beckworth, commander of the Desert 
One mission, with the poor interoperability of his rescue team’s personnel, training, and 
equipment in My American Journey, 249.  Caspar Weinberger describes the problems of inter-
service communications during Granada, as well as his experience with critics’ charges that inter-
service rival determined the size and scope of the American invasion force.  Weinberger, 125-
126. 
38 
of “jointness”.96  The source of interoperability stemmed from efforts begun 
combined American-NATO efforts in early 1970s that produced the Active 
Defense Doctrine of 1976.  These continuing TRADOC studies, conducted in 
close cooperation with the Air Force and NATO allies, led to the U.S. Army 
publishing a new doctrine in 1982. 
 The new doctrine – AirLand Battle – took on a deep view of the battlefield 
with an aim not only to defeat a main attacking force, but also desynchronize and 
disrupt the successive Soviet echelons that followed behind.97   Taking 
advantage of new communications architecture, AirLand Battle called for the 
integration of air-land operations in an expected conventional, nuclear, and 
chemical environment, shifting the focus on the battlefield away from the attrition-
based Active Defense Doctrine in the late 1970s.  The new doctrine’s focus  
would be on aggressive, initiative-based action incorporating the German Army 
concept of Auftragstaktik, which called for the training of combat leaders to think 
and act independently while operating with a clear understanding of the their 
commander’s intent.98  This doctrine, introduced while Colin Powell was brigade 
commander at Ft. Carson, would serve as the primary battlefield doctrine for 
combined American ground and air operations from the Panama Invasion to the 
1991 Gulf War and up to the mid-1990’s. 
Meanwhile, in the mid-1980s the Air Force Checkmate planning division 
was conducting a reassessment of an earlier Allied Air Forces Central Europe 
(AAFCE) study that had looked at the feasibility of disrupting a Soviet attack in 
Central Europe by striking at the Warsaw Pact fuel system.  The initial AAFCE 
study had rejected the idea as unfeasible because it would require “several 
thousand” sorties to effectively strike enough targets to achieve the desired 
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effect.99  However, when Checkmate re-looked at the issue, it found that by 
identifying approximately 40 aim points that the number of sorties necessary to 
cause an operational level disruption of the Warsaw Pact fuel distribution system 
was dramatically reduced to around 150.100  The discussion over the link 
between the identification of vital nodes and producing specific operational 
outcomes would have a profound impact almost a decade and a half later in the 
debates over whether precision-munitions technology finally allowed strategic 
bombing to produce the conditions necessary to win wars. 
The Executive Branch, Congressional, and military’s institutional efforts 
during the two terms of the Reagan administration – all aimed at addressing the 
decline of American power as a result of Vietnam – resulted in a synergy that 
dramatically changed the capabilities and perception of American military power 
by the time George Bush became President.  These included not only the 
massive budget increases funding an entirely new generation of weapons but 
also the continuous incorporation of technologies including integrated sensors, 
stealth technology, electronic warfare systems and techniques, and precision 
guided munitions; the recruitment of high-caliber educated volunteer personnel; 
the refinement of professional military and leadership education systems; the 
expansion of realistic training environments at home and overseas; and the push 
to create better inter-service interoperability.101   
Powell described his perception of this change – that in the 1980s, 
America’s military had turned a corner – when writing about first departure from 
the Reagan administration in March 1986.  He writes that he left the Pentagon on 
his last day walking tall and feeling a sense of pride in his service, ending this 
particular chapter of his autobiography with “[i]t may have been my imagination, 
but it seemed to me that during the Reagan-Weinberger years, everyone in the 
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military started standing taller too.”102  His perception of a change of confidence 
in the U.S. military during this period is not alone; it is confirmed by polling data 
of the general public as well.  In polling conducted by Harris Interactive between 
1971 and 1990, the percentages of respondents reporting ”a great deal of 
confidence” in the U.S. military as an institution rose from an average of 29.5% 
throughout the 1970’s to an average of 35% in the next decade.103   This upward 
trend of confidence in the military has continued; to the extent that when 
compared with 15 other major public or business institutions in the United States, 
the U.S. military has remained consistently the most trusted public institution 
since 1990.104 
 
C. THE FIRST TEST: OPERATION JUST CAUSE 
 On 3 October 1989, Colin Powell became the twelfth CJCS since 1949.  
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the role of the Chairman, 
strengthening the position to make the CJCS the chief military advisor to the 
President and the Secretary of Defense.  General Powell would provide his 
advice through three major American military deployments during the Bush 
administration.  His advice, Powell admits, would be heavily influenced by the six 
tests of the Weinberger Doctrine, which he used as the starting points for any 
discussion when advising the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense 
about the use of American military forces.105  The first test of the Bush 
administration, Powell, and the resurgent U.S. military would come in Panama 
against Manuel Noriega’s regime, only two and a half months after he became 
the CJCS. 
On 17 December 1989, tensions reached a head with the Noriega regime 
and General Powell gave his military recommendation to Secretary of Defense 
that the United States should proceed with the military invasion of Panama.                                              
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According to Powell, both the threat posed by the Panamanian Defense Forces 
(PDF) to the large community of Americans in Panama and the lack of political 
legitimacy for the Noriega regime clearly met the tests for justified use of force by 
the United States.106  After a final consultation with the service chiefs, he also 
believed the United States commitment of nearly 30,000 troops was sufficient to 
ensure that “within hours… Noriega… would no longer be in power and that we 
would have created the conditions that would allow the elected Endara 
government… to take office.”107  That afternoon he reiterated to the President his 
belief that the planned military taskforce could not only accomplish the policy 
objectives of removing Noriega but also meet the military requirements to restore 
law and order in Panama until the legitimately elected government could take 
power. 
A year earlier, while the National Security Advisor to the Reagan 
administration, Powell had argued strenuously – along with Secretary of Defense 
Carlucci and the previous CJCS, Admiral William Howe – that there was not 
enough justification for using American military force to remove Noriega.108  
However, over the intervening year, the circumstances had changed.  Noriega’s 
complicity in drug trafficking while also on the American payroll had been 
exposed to greater public and Congressional scrutiny and several coups against 
him had ended in failure.  Similarly, several American attempts at a diplomatic 
solution had all ended in failure.109  When the Panamanian strongman 
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announced that the United States had created conditions amounting to a 
declaration of war against Panama and then encouraged violence against 
American service members stationed in Panama, Powell believed that the United 
States had a pretext for armed intervention.110  On the morning of 20 December 
1989, as American forces were engaging the PDF, President Bush outlined to 
the nation the four reasons that the United States was invading Panama: 1.) to 
safeguard the lives of the 35,000 U.S. citizens in Panama, 2.) to restore the 
democratically elected government, 3.) to combat drug trafficking supported by 
Noriega’s regime, and 4.) to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal.111 
Despite some valid criticism of specific problems during the invasion, the 
success of Operation Just Cause displayed just how far the improvements of the 
Reagan era had moved the United States military.112   The mix of mechanized 
and light forces, supplemented with a large commitment of special operations 
forces, marked the operation “as a harbinger of the requirements of future U.S. 
contingency operations and demonstrated how far the military had come in 
executing joint operations.”113  The logistical accomplishments also attested to 
improvements in American power projection capabilities, showing that the military 
clearly could “plan, load, and launch a mission-tailored, multibrigade force 
directly from CONUS, fly it anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, and drop it 
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directly into combat.”114  Finally, Lieutenant General Stiner, the maneuver 
commander of the invasion force, gave credit in his testimony to Congress to the 
effectiveness of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act in establishing the framework for 
joint cooperation during the operation.115 
The lessons of Panama confirmed for Powell the convictions he had built 
up over the previous 20 years serving in the Army and at the Pentagon.  Not only 
was the military walking tall after the long estrangement resulting from Vietnam, 
but also he believed that the simple rules he had learned earlier in his strategic 
education provided a clear and workable framework for the effective use of force 
in the post-Reagan era.116  He writes, “Whatever threats we faced in the future, I 
intended to make these rules the bedrock of my military counsel.”117  It would be 
these rules that would influence his counsel two years later in the face of the 
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
 
D. THE 1991 GULF WAR AND THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE  
Operation Just Cause demonstrated the marked improvement of U.S. 
military capabilities in the decade-and-a-half since the end of Vietnam.  With the 
slow dissolution of the Soviet Union underway and the international order in flux, 
the question remained: Under what circumstances would the United States be 
willing to use force to achieve national goals?  The invasion of Panama had very 
clearly been successful in overthrowing the Noriega regime in a short time with a 
minimal loss of American life, but whether this was a one-time event or the signal 
of a new American willingness to back its diplomacy with teeth remained up for 
debate.  Whether the Panama invasion and the new AirLand Battle-focused 
military truly marked the end of the decline in American power would have to wait 
for a more robust test.   
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The test was not long in coming.  On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq launched a lightning-quick invasion of its tiny, oil-rich neighbor, Kuwait with 
an eye on annexing its vast oil reserves.  Iraq was $80 billion in debt after its 
decade-long war with Iran, so the regime saw the acquisition of Kuwait as a way 
to wipe part of its huge debt, both because the Kuwaitis held part of that debt and 
because the invasion would send a strong message to the rest of the Gulf States 
about over-production - something the cash-starved Iraqis saw as robbing them 
by lowering the global price of oil.118  The fact that adding the Kuwaiti oil reserves 
to its own would put Iraq behind only Saudi Arabia in total world oil reserves did 
not count against the plan either.119 
 Powell’s initial role in the crisis was to voice caution over any major 
deployment of American troops to the region.120  When intelligence clearly began 
to show that the Iraqi military was massing at the Kuwaiti border, Powell – 
worried about the lack of clear objectives for a major deployment – admitted that, 
while ”I was not reluctant, clearly I did not leap on it and say ‘let’s do this right 
away’”.121  The only operation of American military forces in response to the Iraqi 
build-up was the deployment of two KC-135 refueling planes and one C-141 to 
the United Arab Emirates at their request – the ruling sheik both taking the threat 
of the Iraqi build-up seriously and wanting to extend the range of his French 
Mirage 2000s while having American forces in country as a sign of support.122  
Other than that, without strong military, civilian, or intelligence  
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recommendations for a show of force, the Bush administration pursued only 
diplomatic efforts to deal with the Iraqi moves – none of which proved effective 
enough to deter the Saddam Hussein. 
 The day after Iraq launched its invasion, General Powell and Secretary of 
Defense Cheney met to discuss how to advise the President to respond.123  
Cheney wondered whether the American public would support forcing Iraq out of 
Kuwait or if toppling Hussein would be possible.  Powell, on the other hand, still 
worried about the situation escalating beyond control, advocated sending both a 
message and sizable military force to clearly define Saudi Arabia as off-limits.  
Beyond that, he feared that the American public would not support a war to put 
the Emir of Kuwait on his throne in order to ensure cheap oil.  The meeting 
became acrimonious as Powell continued to fixate on getting the civilian 
leadership to define their political goals for any military deployment.  It broke up 
with Cheney cutting off further discussion about political objectives and angrily 
ordering Powell to develop military options for the President to deal with the 
invasion.124  
 Powell’s arguments for a defensive “line in the sand” were supported by 
President Bush and the Saudi regime almost immediately.  Powell, focused on 
limiting the scope of the deployment, continued to push for a clear statement of 
the political and military objective for the build-up that had so far been limited just 
to defending Saudi Arabia.  His fixation reach the point that when he brought up 
his concerns with the President during a National Security meeting, the Secretary 
of Defense reprimanded him afterward for straying beyond his role in advising on 
military matters.125   
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On 3 August, President Bush announced from Camp David that the Iraqi 
invasion “would not stand.”  On 6 August, American troops began flowing onto 
the peninsula. Meanwhile, as the administration pursued diplomatic sanctions 
through the United Nations (U.N.), Powell and the Commander of Central 
Command (CENTCOM), General Norman Schwarzkopf briefed the President on 
the timetable for the military build-up, including identifying critical time estimates 
when the growing coalition force could transition to operations beyond just 
deterrence and defense.  Immediately after he received the briefing from Powell 
and Schwarzkopf, the President announced at a live event from the Pentagon the 
national objectives of the ongoing deployment: “The immediate, complete, and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of 
Kuwait’s legitimate government.”126 
  After the President’s remarks outlining the mission objectives, Powell’s 
focus shifted to ensuring that the U.S. military could fulfill Bush’s promise that 
Iraqi aggression would not stand if diplomatic efforts failed.  As American forces 
continued to flow into Saudi Arabia, the Air Force staff presented the plan 
“Instant Thunder,” which outlined an air campaign focused on knocking out 
strategic targets throughout Iraq.127  The plan impressed Powell, who directed 
that it be expanded to include a tactical element to strike at Iraqi forces in Kuwait.  
Meanwhile, Schwarzkopf and his planners presented their plan for a frontal 
ground attack, which was greeted with an unenthusiastic response.128 
 In the wake of the first ground plan’s rejection, what followed was a 
dialectic process between Powell’s focus on achieving “overwhelming force” and 
Secretary Cheney’s impatience for an attack on the Iraqis.  Powell continued to 
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advocate a massive attack that would completely crush the Iraqis; to accomplish 
this, he believed that the buildup needed to continue.  This also served his desire 
to avoid a confrontation in order to give sanctions a chance to work.129  On the 
other hand, Cheney had come to the conclusion that only military force would 
dislodge the Iraqis and that the military needed to present a plan to the President 
that he could implement at his pleasure.  His team came up with the idea of a 
“Western Excursion”, a plan to avoid the main concentration of Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait by outflanking them.  The idea was to either force a political settlement 
with the Iraqis in a territory-for-territory swap or to threaten Bagdad and force the 
Iraqis to redeploy from their prepared positions and expose themselves to 
American airpower.130   
The tension between the two positions finally resulted in a compromise 
between the Secretary and the CJCS.  Cheney’s compromise was acceptance 
that for the coalition attack to be “overwhelmingly” successful, the total number of 
troops needed to be built up before any attack could take place.  Powell’s 
compromise was to accept that a ground attack would have to take place.  He 
also accepted the essence of the “Western Excursion,” with one major 
modification – the focus of the western arc would be to outflank and destroy Iraqi 
forces in Kuwait.  This led to Cheney’s second compromise, a tacit agreement 
that by focusing on the Iraqi forces around Kuwait, the war’s objective would be 
limited to Kuwait’s liberation, not the overthrow of Hussein.  The friction and the 
resulting compromise between Cheney and Powell “was extremely healthy,” 
according to one of Powell’s aides.  While Cheney always wanted an immediate 
attack, he did not always understand the enormity of the build-up require.  
However, because of his constant demands on Powell, “we probably would not 
have been ready as soon as we were if it had not been for Cheney’s 
pressure.”131   
                                            
129 Gordon and Trainor, 140 and 146. 
130 Ibid., 143-147. 
131 Ibid., p 141. 
48 
 The result of this effort was that on 15 January 1991, after five months of 
coalition build-up and no diplomatic solution, American forces began bombing 
Iraqi targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait – the deterrent build-up of Operation 
Desert Shied had transitioned to the offensive Operation Desert Storm.   The air 
campaign continued until 24 February, when at 0359 the first Marine ground units 
began crossing into Kuwait to engage the demoralized and battered Iraqi 
occupation forces.  Later that day, Army units began their western flanking attack 
through the deserts of Iraq, the result of which would culminate in the successful 
liberation of Kuwait but fail to cut off retreating Iraqi forces before the 100-hour 
ground war ended.132  Ultimately, the victory in Kuwait fulfilled Powell’s goal of 
keeping military objectives focused on clearly defined, achievable political goals, 
limited in scope while executing operations with overwhelming force.133 
 
E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VICTORY 
 The conduct of the 1991 Gulf War very clearly shows Colin Powell’s 
fingerprints all over it.  It also shows the imprint left by his interpretation of the 
Weinberger Doctrine.  Very early on, Powell agreed that vital American and allied 
interests were threatened by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, though his main focus 
was on the danger to Saudi Arabia.  Powell’s focus on achieving overwhelming 
force before launching Operation Desert Storm ensured that when the United 
States and coalition forces began both the air and ground phases of the war, 
both attacks achieved decisive impacts against Iraqi forces.  Like the Grenada 
and Panama operations, this resulted in not only overwhelming the enemy forces 
but also helping keep American casualties to a minimum.   
Powell’s reticence at kicking off operations early in the war without first 
achieving the force levels he thought necessary also helped lead to the 
compromise with Secretary Cheney that produced the effective western flanking 
attack.  The compromise that produced the ground plan also helped clarify the 
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political and military objectives of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.  Throughout the 
war, Powell was able to adjust the relationship between the war’s objectives and 
the conduct of operations as events impacted on the strategic picture, such as 
when he modified the air campaign as a result of the accidental bombing of the 
Al Firdos bunker and when he successfully influenced an early ceasefire as the 
result of the “Highway of Death” images.134  All these factors, along with the 
generally high level of support shown to the military by the American public and 
Congress, as well as the failure of early diplomatic attempts to obtain an Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait, show that the Bush administration’s conduct of the 1991 
Gulf War arguably met every test of the Weinberger Doctrine 
On the other hand, critics maintain that Powell’s approach early in the 
crisis, when he opposed the deployment of military forces to the Gulf in response 
to signs of an Iraqi build-up, led to fatal limitations on American diplomatic efforts 
to prevent the invasion.135  They also point out that his tight focus on sticking to 
the objective of liberating Kuwait and his support for an early end to the war “left 
Washington without the means for influencing events in postwar Iraq.”136  Finally, 
they charge that his all-or-nothing approach, while successful in 1991, is 
insufficient to deal with the host of other conflicts that the United States faces in 
the wake of the post-Cold War era.137 
What Panama had hinted at, the 1991 Gulf War confirmed: Whatever the 
benefits or limitations of Powell approach to influencing American use of force 
during the war, the liberation of Kuwait marked a very real end of the perception 
of an American decline.  First, in the face of Soviet impotence, the United States 
was successfully able to lead and maintain a coalition of 34 countries throughout 
the war, establishing an almost unquestioned preeminence within the 
international order.  Second, the all-volunteer U.S. military’s remarkable defeat of 
the Soviet-style Iraqi forces demonstrated that the long road back from the post-
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Vietnam “hollow force” was over.  Even with all the problems and backbiting 
between the services in coordinating the war effort, the level of integration shown 
throughout the campaign illustrated just how far the U.S. effort at “jointness” had 
advanced.  Finally, the level of sophistication displayed by American technology 




V. CLINTON, THE NEW GLOBAL AGE, AND THE DECLINE OF 
WEINBERGER-POWELL (1993–2000) 
A. NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
 The Gulf War marked the emergence of a new and completely different 
perception of U.S. military power by American policymakers.  The last security 
strategy to list a peer military threat was President Reagan’s 1988 national 
security strategy which stated that its first priority remained to “restore our 
nation's military strength after a period of decline in which the Soviet Union 
overtook us in many critical categories of military power.”138  This perception 
changed after the 1991 Gulf War and the face of the rapid decline of the Soviet 
Union.  This was reflected in George Bush’s 1991 national security strategy when 
the President said, “Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United 
States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in 
every dimension – political, economic and military.”139 
The end of the Gulf War also marked the start of a political, economic, and 
social transition period for the entire world.  On Christmas Day, almost nine 
months after the first American troops began returning from Operation Desert 
Storm, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.  The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. marked 
the end of an era that had defined international relations for over four and a half 
decades.  The Soviet Union’s long decline had made possible the American-led 
coalition that opposed Saddam Hussein while the Kremlin’s diplomatic and 
military impotence had prevented it from exercising a decisive role to avert an 
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Iraqi defeat.140  With the demise of both the Soviet Union and the ideological 
divide between the East and the West, the events of the Gulf War seemed to 
forecast the possibility of a new era in international cooperation and 
multilateralism.  It also marked the end of the United States only peer competitor 
and left it the world’s sole superpower, a view that would be reinforced by certain 
operational factors throughout the coming decade. 
 A year later, the prospects for a “New World Order” still seemed promising 
even after President George Bush lost the 1992 election to William (Bill) J. 
Clinton.141  Within the next couple of years the United States came out of a 
recession and entered into a prosperous “Goldilocks Economy,” in part by taking 
advantage of the globalization phenomenon.142  Many of the European nations 
previously trapped on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain openly embraced free-
market reforms and democratization efforts.  For most of Central Europe, the end 
of the Cold War also signaled the beginning of a long process of integration into 
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the European Union (EU) and accession into NATO.143  In the Pacific, political 
movements during the 1990’s brought about peaceful, democratic transitions in 
Taiwan and South Korea while in South and Central America, nations such as 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru saw new attempts at pluralistic multiparty 
politics, integration into the world economy, and sharp drops in ideological 
violence. 
 The break-up of the Soviet Union also helped move the concept of 
economic integration, initially motivated by security interests and alliance 
cohesion, beyond just the core areas in the United States, Western Europe, 
Japan, and their network of allied states.144   Beginning in 1944, the West had 
created several economic regimes that gradually expanded cooperation and 
more closely integrated markets among the western economies - transitioning 
from Bretton Woods to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
finally becoming in 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO).145  With the end 
of the Soviet Union, former communist and Third World nations became more 
willing to participate in the free market system, especially through the WTO.146  
The end of the Cold War also saw a marked increase in the movement of capital, 
increased trade in merchandise, greater trade in services, and key developments  
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in finance as well as the expansion of global and regional trade regimes, all 
heralding the process of globalization that has come to characterize today’s 
political and economic environment.147 
Despite these promising developments and predictions such as Francis 
Fukuyama’s 1992 liberal, free-market vision in The End of History and the Last 
Man148, President Clinton entered office at a time when U.S. troops were 
deployed in more places around the world than at any time since President 
Truman inauguration.149  His administration also took over during a period when 
the delayed effects of the Soviet’s breakup began to fully manifest in conflicts 
around the world.  In Europe, ethnic conflict wracked Yugoslavia as it broke apart 
and violence in several former Soviet republics spawned “frozen conflicts” that 
have yet to be resolved.150  Ethnic and nationalistic grievances, assumed to have 
been extinguished by the solidarity of over seven decades of socialist and 
communist brotherhood, had only lain dormant and were still sources of tension 
in the multi-ethnic communities in these former communist nations.151   
This period also saw the emergence of new threats and crises in the 
Islamic world and sub-Saharan Africa.  In the Middle East, crackdowns by 
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authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia exported a new brand of 
extremist Islamic fundamentalism into the lawless regions of Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  Similarly throughout Africa, revolutionary and 
ideological conflicts had already destabilized many nations, weakened civil 
society, and undermined state institutions to the point where in many cases 
government control was close to non-existent.  Now, the lack of interest and loss 
of superpower sponsorship subsidizing these weak and authoritarian 
governments began to change the sources and scope of tensions within many 
arbitrarily drawn African borders.  After an initial period of post–Cold War 
euphoria and democratization, many African states relapsed into violence and 
lawlessness.152  This time, however, ethnic and religious tension served as the 
primary fuel exacerbating the already dire economic and social conditions 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa.153 
 This combination of communism’s collapse, increasing economic 
globalization, and the release of nationalistic, ethnic, and religious tensions 
placed the Clinton administration in a unique situation.154  Without the Soviet 
Union “to rally a national consensus”, Clinton’s was the first American presidency 
in four and half decades not to start with a default national security strategy 
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aimed at “containment”.155  On 27 September 1993, Clinton announced his 
foreign policy vision of “Democratic Enlargement,” the overriding purpose of 
which would be “to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-
based democracies… [and]… to enlarge the circle of nations that live under 
those free institutions.”156  Almost a week later, however, this vision would be 
sorely tested when a battle in Mogadishu between U.N. forces and Somali 
militias would leave 18 American soldiers dead.  This event would greatly impact 
the Clinton administration’s search to define a national security vision clearly 
defining the role of military force during the next eight years. 
 
B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE USE OF FORCE 
 When the Clinton administration took office in January 1993, it seemed 
profoundly uncomfortable with the idea of applying the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine to American policy when the U.S. military seemed so clearly capable of 
accomplishing more than just looking after vital national interests.  In 1992, while 
still a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, President Clinton’s first 
Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, commented that the doctrine was not 
permissive enough in describing ways legitimately to use military force in the new 
post-Cold War era.157  He stated that "this brand new world of ours is a world of 
turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has provoked calls for the use of military 
force in a whole range of circumstances that don't fit the mold [of the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine].”158  After taking office, Secretary Aspin again reiterated his 
views on continuing to apply the Weinberger-Powell by saying that the American 
people, no longer faced with a Soviet threat requiring a military budget of “$250 
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billion or even $200 billion,” might not be willing to pay for armed forces that 
could “only very, very rarely” be employed.159 
 Aspin’s comments echoed many of then-candidate Clinton’s pre-election 
charges that the Bush administration was incapable of making the transition to 
the new post-Cold War world.160  In the September after the election, National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake gave a preview of the upcoming Clinton 
“Democratic Enlargement” speech.  Never mentioning it by name, he also 
alluded to his belief that while some of the tests of the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine were valid, the prohibition against using force only in pursuit of vital 
interests was too restrictive.  Instead, he suggested that the more important 
“strategic question – the question of ‘where’” to use force – should guide 
American policy when deciding to commit its military.161   
Lake then lay out his four criteria for the use of America power: first, to 
strengthen the ‘core’ community of major market democracies; second, to “foster 
and consolidate new democracies and market economies… especially in states 
of special significance”; third, to “counter the aggression… of states hostile to 
democracy and markets”; and fourth, to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only 
by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics 
take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”162  This vision – focused 
on strengthening the post-Cold War trend towards democratization and free 
market globalization as well as addressing the need for ways to engage in 
humanitarian crises that would have otherwise been restricted by Cold War 
limitations – would face three great tests in the upcoming eight years.163  
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The first test would involve a debacle during humanitarian support to the 
U.N. in Somalia, resulting from the type of gradualism that the Never Again 
school abhors.  When President Bush approved the mission in November 1992, 
the objective was to support humanitarian efforts to deal with the famine in 
Somalia, specifically to provide security and transportation assistance for aid 
deliveries.164   In March 1993, two months after President Clinton took office, the 
U.N. took over operational control of the security mission, expanding its focus to 
promote political stabilization throughout the country by supporting efforts by 
Somali faction leaders to form a federal government.165   
By May 1993, violence had abated to the point where President Clinton 
authorized the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) and reduced the American commitment of combat forces to around 
1,300 troops.166  Almost immediately, militia violence flared dramatically at the 
instigation of Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s Habr Gidr faction, resulting in the deaths 
of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers.  In response, Admiral Jonathan Howe (ret.), the 
head of the U.N. mission in Mogadishu, posted a $25,000 reward for the arrest of 
Aidid while American special operations forces attached to the U.N. launched 
raids against his faction in an attempt to capture him.   
Mark Bowden’s book Blackhawk Down, which focuses on the 3 October 
1993 battle in Mogadishu that led to the deaths of the 18 American military 
personnel, also covers the political and operational decisions surrounding the 
change in focus from humanitarian support to assisting in nation-building by the 
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U.N. and American forces in Somalia. 167  One of his conclusions is that the 
Mogadishu battle resulted in a critical withdrawal of American support for the 
U.N. effort to establish a stable coalition government in Somalia, resulting in its 
failure.168   Another important conclusion was that the battle ended a sense of 
American military invincibility conferred by the 1991 Gulf War, Bowden, in fact, 
observes that “Mogadishu has had a profound cautionary influence on U.S. 
military policy ever since”.169 
 Critics of the disaster focused their attention on specifics such as whether 
there were even American interests in Somalia worth the commitment, whether 
American forces had been adequately equipped to conduct the new nation-
building objective, and what role the U.N. command structure played in hindering 
the rescue of the trapped Rangers.170  The fallout from Somalia would limit any 
new Clinton administration initiative to deal with the other two major humanitarian 
crises facing it, Rwanda and Bosnia.  Congressional and public revulsion at the 
pictures of dead Americans being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu 
dampened support for sending troops into another ethnic conflict where U.S. 
interests were not clearly identifiable.171  The limitations stemming from the  
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public’s anger over Somalia would contribute to American inaction in Rwanda, 
resulting in a genocidal massacre of between half a million and a million Tutsis 
and Hutu moderates.172 
 In Bosnia, meanwhile, the scope of the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign 
continued to spiral out of control despite repeated attempts at diplomatic 
solutions and the gradual introduction of U.N. peacekeepers to protect specified 
Muslim “safe havens”.  Even in the face of the Clinton administration’s threats to 
increase American involvement, nothing seemed to prove effective at halting the 
Serbian offensives between 1992 and early 1995.  One case study of the conflict 
suggests that both the vagueness of American strategic threats combined with 
the “clear indication that the United States was not willing to deploy ground 
forces,” led the Serbs to believe that there would be no serious effort to prevent 
their continued campaign against the Muslims and Croats.173  No amount of 
gradual escalation proved effective at forcing the Serbs to seriously engage at 
the negotiation table until the successful combined Muslim-Croat offensive in 
September 1995 (backed by massive NATO airpower) threatened to reverse all 
of their gains.174  Once it became clear that the tables were turning and that 
NATO was willing to use force against them in a meaningful way, the Serbs 
agreed to implement the Dayton Accords by December 1995. 
 In March 1996, after the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) had been 
firmly in place in Bosnia for three an a half months, President Clinton’s second 
Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, further distanced the administration from 
the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine when he gave his annual report to Congress.  In 
his introduction, he broadened the instances in which the United States would be 
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willing to use force, with the key criteria being “whether the risks at stake are 
vital, important, or humanitarian.”175   Two days later, National Security Advisor 
Lake presented “seven circumstances which, taken in some combination or even 
alone, may call for the use of force or military forces.”176  While including the 
“vital interest” criteria of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, they also added the 
preservation, promotion and defense of democracy; the prevention of the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and international crime and drug 
trafficking; the use of force to maintain a sense of American reliability; and the 
use of force for humanitarian purposes to combat famines, natural disasters and 
gross abuses of human rights.177  While including the qualification that diplomacy 
would remain the first tool of American policy, the speech still set the threshold 
for the commitment of American military force much lower than it had been.178 
 During this period, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), claiming to 
represent Albanian Muslim aspirations for the independence of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) province of Kosovo, began staging increased 
attacks against Serbian police.  By February 1998, violence had increase 
exponentially as Serbian military units assaulted KLA strongholds throughout 
Kosovo; almost immediately images of alleged Serbian massacres began 
appearing in Western media.  By August 1998, American diplomats sent a veiled 
threat to FRY leadership with the announcement that NATO had approved plans 
for the use of military force in Kosovo and would conduct joint exercises with 
Albania.  Despite a lull in the fighting with the introduction of Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers, neither the KLA nor the 
Serbian military seemed willing to quit the conflict.  After a second round of talks  
 
                                            
175 William J. Perry, “A Defense Strategy for the Post-Cold War World,” Introduction to the 
Annual Report to Congress, 4 March 1996. Available online at http://www.fas.org/nuke 
/control/ctr/news/96-03-04.html (11 June 2006). 
176 Anthony Lake, “’Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines,” Remarks by Anthony Lake at 
George Washington University, Washington,” Defense Issues. vol. 11, no. 14 (6 March 1996)  





between American Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević ended in failure, NATO began air attacks on Serbian military 
forces in Kosovo.   
Despite a dramatic increase in the use of precision guided-weapons over 
the 1991 Gulf War179, after six weeks General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), assessed that the bombing campaign had failed 
to halt Serbian military operations in Kosovo and that in fact, there were more 
Serb forces operating in the province than when airstrikes had started.180  By the 
end of the 78-day air campaign, however, NATO air attacks were achieving a 
much better effect because a KLA ground offensive was forcing Serbian military 
units to concentrate in response to their assaults as well as because NATO 
began targeting political and civilian infrastructure within Serbia proper.181  In the 
end, Milošević caved to the air strikes and international pressure and agreed to 
withdraw Serb military units from Kosovo and to allow NATO ground force, 
dubbed the Kosovo Force (KFOR), to begin deployment into the province.182   
 The Kosovo Campaign marked the capstone of a remarkable change that 
had occurred since the end of the Vietnam War in how American leaders viewed 
the use of force.  The possibility that any minor conflict could escalate into a 
world crisis involving the two superpowers was now over with the end of the Cold                                             
179 During the total air campaign more than 100 cruise missiles were launched and over 
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Against Yugoslavia,” House Armed Services Committee Staff, 30 June 1999, 1. 
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well as the 27 May trip by Secretary of Defense Cohen to Europe to meet with his counterparts in 
order to discuss ground force options.  Daalder and O’Hanlon, 131-132. 
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War.  While the Clinton administration found the constraints imposed by alliance 
considerations and the international system still limiting unilateral American 
actions in the new world order, the absence of a peer competitor allowed the 
United States almost unprecedented latitude on the world stage.  Another factor 
contributing to the new American assertiveness was the effect of the latest 
generation of precision-guided munitions, weapons which seemed to promise a 
level of effectiveness that undercut Powell’s maxim for the need to achieve 
“overwhelming force.”183   This assessment proved somewhat premature,  
especially when President Clinton later admitted that he had miscalculated when 
he thought that international pressure and precisions airstrikes alone could force 
Milošević to capitulate within “a couple of days”.184  What the Kosovo campaign 
did, however, was confirm what certain strategic writers had been claiming since 
the 1991 Gulf War – that American military technology and doctrine was causing 
an RMA that was allowing it to leave the rest of the world behind.185  
 
C. THE SEEDS OF TRANSFORMATION 
 The 1996 Clinton, in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement, declared that American “military might is unparalleled.”186   The 
military’s success during Operation Desert Storm had both lain to rest the ghost 
of Vietnam and seemed to indicate that American military technology and 
doctrine had brought about a revolution in warfare that left the United States 
without a military peer.  However, within the U.S. military each service scrambled 
to justify its conclusions about the source of success in the war in order to 
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attempt gain a better position for itself in the next inevitable budget fight.  For the 
Army, the Gulf War vindicated its vision of combined arms warfare and validated 
the AirLand Battle Doctrine.187  Some in the Air Force believed that the Gulf War 
pointed to the possibility that air power could finally achieve in practice what 
proponents such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell had only theorized.188  
Finally, for the Navy and Marine Corps, the success of the Tomahawk cruise 
missile, the effectiveness of Naval and Marine Corps air power, and the 
contributions of the Marine assault on Kuwait City during the ground attack all 
pointed to a new littoral role for their services in the post-Cold War.189   
Even with its stellar performance against Iraq, the U.S. military had lost its 
primary raison d'etre with the disappearance of the Soviet Union.  In the first term 
of the Clinton presidency, the Department of Defense’s budget dropped by nearly 
12 percent.190  Between 1991 and 1993, Congress authorized measures to 
downsize the military, steadily increasing the number of personnel eligible for 
involuntarily separation under Reduction in Force (RIF) plans each year.191  This 
trauma confirmed that Les Aspin was not making an idle threat when he 
predicted the American people might not be willing to pay for armed forces they 
could rarely use.  In fact, without an adversary on the scale of the Soviet Union, 
Congress and the public were signaling that they wanted to cash in on the Cold 
War “peace dividend.”   
One of the casualties in the post-Gulf War environment was Army-Air 
Force cooperation within the AirLand Battle context.  While the Navy and Marines 
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concentrated on a littoral focus – the Navy publishing its strategic concept 
…From the Sea in 1992 and an update, Forward… from the Sea in 1994 – the 
Army and the Air Force struggled to find a way to compromise on how to 
synchronize air and land campaigns during war.192  The debate between the two 
services was especially bitter over who controlled the deep battle.193  By 1997, 
the Air Force published its Air Force Basic Doctrine, which stressed the ability of 
airpower to achieve mass through effect, not necessarily quantity, as well as is 
ability to “dictate the tempo and direction of an entire warfighting effort from 
Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) through major conflict.”194 
The Air Force could make these claims, in part, because the United States 
continued to develop and integrate new capabilities into its stockpile of precision-
guided weapons.  Systems developed during this period included the Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM) which employs Global Positioning System (GPS) 
satellite navigation terminal guidance as its primary means of attack enabling the 
United States to upgrade its existing inventory of general purpose bombs.  
Research and development also began producing the next generation of 
advanced sensor and intelligence platforms, including space-based systems, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and manned airborne systems.  At the 
forefront of these developments were Air Force strategists who were declaring in 
1993 “One could argue that all targets are precision targets – even individual 
tanks, artillery pieces, or infantrymen. There is no logical reason why… bombs 
should be wasted... Ideally, every shot fired should find its mark.”195 
It was also during this period that the idea of network-centric warfare 
emerged.  This concept, originally developed between 1998 and 2001 by Vice 
Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, focused on the potential of new networking 
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technology and methodologies.  The end result was to produce a transformation 
in the military thought and a “new mental model of warfare that emphasizes 
outcomes, or effects.”196  Proponents suggest “that just as a network of 
computers is much more capable than a number of stand-alone units, a network 
of military platforms will be more efficient, faster, and more capable than the 
same number of unconnected platforms.”197  By taking advantage of America’s 
asymmetric technological advantage, network-centric proponents believe the 
U.S. can achieve information superiority on the battlefield, the “key factor to 
success in the future.”198 
While the services tried to come to terms with the changes brought about 
by new technology, some in the Clinton administration (most notably Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright) saw the post-Cold War era as a chance to increase U.S. 
military involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts, a trend previously 
started by President Bush in 1992 with Operation Provide Hope in Somalia.199  
While the Somalia nation-building exercise ended in failure after the battle in 
Mogadishu, President Clinton’s vision of Engagement and Enlargement left each 
of the services scrambling to find a way to justify its budget in an era of 
humanitarian and peacekeeping deployments.   This period was especially 
traumatic for the U.S. Army.  Each of the other services could provide 
expeditionary support with relative ease.  The Navy had the ability to get carrier 
battle groups almost anywhere around the world quickly; the Marines fielded swift 
deploying, self-contained Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF); and the Air 
Force’s global reach, both strike and heavy lift, could reach almost any spot on 
the globe.  This left the Army the odd man out. 
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The most glaring example of the U.S. Army’s inability to tailor its Cold War 
force structure and come to terms with the new humanitarian/peacekeeping/ 
peace-enforcement focus under the Clinton administration was its failure to 
provide an effective contribution during the 1999 Kosovo Conflict.  When its Task 
Force Hawk finally reached Albania and began setting up on the Kosovo border, 
its problems deploying, plus an accident that killed two of its Apache pilots, and 
its inability to find a way to employ its MLRS capabilities without risking 
unacceptable collateral all left the impression that the effort was “slow, 
cumbersome, and hurt the Army’s reputation.”200  Despite a Pentagon report 
after the war stating, “[The U.S. military] successfully integrated air, land, and sea 
operations throughout the conflict,” General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, seemed to know the writing was on the wall if the Army did not get its act 
together. 
 In October 1999, just months after assuming his duties, General Shinseki 
announced his Army Transformation vision.  Looking somewhat like the force 
restructuring proposed by Douglas MacGregor in Breaking the Phalanx201, 
Shinseki declared that one of his top priorities was to build an Interim Brigade 
Combat Team (IBCT) capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96 
hours.202  This IBCT would be the first step in a process that would eventually 
result in the Objective Force – the Army of the future, incorporating technology 
not yet on the drawing board.  Shinseki went on to say that the Army’s current 
“heavy forces are survivable and extremely lethal, but slow to deploy, [and] 
difficult to sustain once deployed…” and its “…light forces are rapidly deployable, 
but lack staying power in the war fight.” 203   The end state, he said was to 
“march towards the Objective Force and the fielding of FCS, the Future Combat 
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System. More than a platform or two, it is a system of integrated capabilities -- 
air, ground, direct and indirect."204  Shinseki promised that the Army 
Transformation agenda would make the U.S. Army more “deployable, agile, 
versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable, and dominant at every point along the 
spectrum of operations”.205 
 Shinseki’s vision of Army Transformation was perhaps the most radical of 
the military services’ attempts to come to terms with the new post-Cold War 
environment during the two terms of the Clinton administration.  The 1980 Desert 
One disaster had already led to both a series of Congressional special 
operations reforms and the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, which created the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOSOC) and fostered closer 
relations among all the services’ Special Operations communities.  For the Navy 
and Marines, meanwhile, the Soviets were gone and so were dreams of a 600-
ship Navy.  Now littoral operations became the focus in the new environment.206  
For the Air Force, advances in precision munitions, networking, and sensor 
technology held the promise that airpower could be “the supported rather than 
the supporting combat element” in future conflicts.207  General Shinseki’s plan for 
the U.S. Army to undergo a radical transformation integrating future technology 
to create a lighter, networked, and modular force may have seemed to be a 
radical departure from the Cold War U.S. Army, but it was by no means the only 
attempt at military Transformation underway when George W. Bush became 
president in 2001. 
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VI. A NEW BUSH VISION, REVOLUTIONS, AND THE 
DISAPPEARANCE OF WEINBERGER-POWELL (2001–) 
A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NEW VIEWS ON FORCE 
 George W. Bush spoke about an ongoing RMA during the lead-up to the 
2000 election and the potential it held for American power.  During the run-up to 
the 2000 election, Bush, said in his keynote defense speech that, if elected he 
would fund a military "revolution" that would "skip a generation of technology.”208 
The first month after he won, Bush again spoke of the potential for an increase in 
American power brought on by an ongoing RMA, saying: 
We're witnessing a revolution in the technology of war, powers 
increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and 
swiftness.  Advantage increasingly comes from information such as 
the three dimensional images of simulated battle that I have just 
seen.  Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long 
arc of precision-guided weapons.  The best way to keep the peace 
is to redefine war on our terms. 209 
He announced, moreover, that he had directed the new Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, to begin a comprehensive review of the United States military, 
the national defense strategy, military structures, and the military’s budget 
priorities.  Rumsfeld, he said, had “a broad mandate to challenge the status quo 
as we design a new architecture for the defense of America and our allies.”210  
President Bush ended by saying that his administration’s “goal is to move beyond 
marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new 
strategy.”211  
 In an interview on 17 August 2001, just weeks before the release of his 
findings, Secretary Rumsfeld began making the case for military change or, as 
                                            
208 Eliot Cohen, “Defending America in the Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, iss. 
6 (Nov/Dec 2000): 40.  Available online at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20001101 
faessay935/eliot-a-cohen/defending-america-in-the-twenty-first-century.html (13 June 2006). 
209 Bush, George W.  Remarks by the President to the Troops, Sailors, and Personnel at the 
Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, 13 February, 2001.  Available at http://www. 




he called it, "Transformation,” saying it would only affect a “modest fraction” of 
the U.S. military.212  He continued by saying that his changes would “focus on 
new technology, especially communications networks, to link current weapons 
systems and provide information on the enemy more speedily to soldiers, sailors, 
pilots and marines.”213  However, he said, there was going to be resistance to 
Transformation because "when (the military services) see that word, there's a 
tendency to think that you go from this to something different. There is a 
tendency to hear the word and think of a platform, a weapons system that is 
distinctly different."214  Instead, he said, Transformation could be as simple as 
"connecting a collection of platforms and capabilities in a way that creates a 
capability that could be characterized as transformed or transformational.”215 
Just days after the 9/11 terror attacks on New York, Washington D.C., and 
Pennsylvania, Secretary Rumsfeld released his review of the U.S. military’s 
defense posture in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  In it, he stated 
that the “central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning 
from [the] ‘threat-based’ model that has dominated thinking in the past to a 
‘capabilities-based’ model for the future.”216    This strategy, he said would 
“support the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces” by focusing on how 
American military capabilities might be challenged rather than on countering the 
threat capability of a specific adversary.217  This was a complete departure from 
the threat-based focus of American strategic planning since the beginning of the 
Cold War.  In effect, the Secretary of Defense was saying that the technological 
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RMA that he and his supporters believed was underway, now allowed the United 
States to conduct its strategic planning without having to worry about a specific 
threat.  By developing certain “capabilities” through the procurement and 
integration of new technology, American forces would have “the potential of 
conducting joint operations more effectively, with smaller forces and fewer 
weapon systems.”218  Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision of a revolution in American 
power would receive its first test in the next few months as the United States 
responded to 9/11 against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda infrastructure in 
Afghanistan.   
 
B. PROSPECT OF AN RMA IN ACTION 
 In the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bush 
administration was forced to come to terms with the limits of American power.  
Even after overcoming the trauma of Vietnam, achieving the status as the world’s 
sole superpower, and making decades of advances in precision-guided 
munitions, networked communications, and new sensor technology, the twenty-
first century U.S. military had trouble adjusting to an enemy whose “members 
lived in caves, rode mules… drove large sports-utility vehicles” and, when fearful 
of U.S. air strikes, abandoned their training camps, leaving air planners no 
practical targets.219  In fact, the military had no contingency plans developed for 
Afghanistan.  The few ideas military leaders presented to Secretary Rumsfeld 
required months of planning that was not politically available.220  When asked by 
the President what response the U.S. military could immediately carry out, the 
Secretary of Defense was forced to reply, “Very little, effectively.”221 
 In fact, the basic concept for fighting the war in Afghanistan came not from 
the U.S. military but from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  On 13 
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September 2001, CIA Director George Tenet and his counterterrorism chief, 
Cofer Black, presented a plan to the President and his National Security Council 
outlining a strategy that would engage both Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in 
Afghanistan.  The plan called for the massive arming and funding of the Taliban’s 
Afghan rivals, the Northern Alliance – a collection of five factions loyal to various 
warlords numbering around 20,000 fighters.222  Meanwhile, CIA covert 
operatives and paramilitary groups, augmented by U.S. military Special Forces 
teams, would link-up with these various factions to both help coordinate 
American and Northern Alliance operations and to serve as a conduit for U.S. air 
strikes.  The combination of Northern Alliance ground troops – familiar with 
fighting in the rugged Afghan terrain – and American precision technology could 
give the Northern Alliance “a significant edge.”223  According to President Bush, 
this combination – allies on the ground, U.S. military technology, and small teams 
of special operatives to serve as a conduit for both – would allow the United 
States to “fight a different war than the Russians fought.”224 
 During October 2001, the CIA and the U.S. military began inserting their 
teams into Afghanistan and linking up with their Northern Alliance counterparts.  
On the 19 October, two teams of Special Forces and Rangers, in a show of 
force, conducted assaults on an airfield and a compound that had been used by 
Mullah Omar.  Throughout this period, CIA teams conducted negotiations with 
Taliban factions and sub-commanders, handing out bribes and persuading 
several to defect.  Meanwhile, the paramilitaries and Special Forces teams 
directed American airpower against identified Taliban concentrations along the 
front lines. 
 While Rumsfeld preferred preplanned targets, the really important ones 
were being identified as the targets of opportunity by CIA and Special Forces 
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teams on the ground.225  In early November 2001, the air planners had run out of 
fixed targets, freeing up most aircraft to respond directly to calls by the Special 
Forces teams.226  These ground teams put the freed up aircraft to good use.  On 
9 November, after a week of some especially effective targeting by a Special 
Forces team that had infiltrated the area, the Taliban stronghold of Mazar-e-
Sharif fell to the Northern Alliance after a Taliban commander switched side.227  
Two days later, another team infiltrated to a position outside Kabul’s Bagram Air 
Base and was able to direct massive air strikes against one of the largest 
concentrations of Taliban forces in Afghanistan.228  By 12 November, several 
Pashtun groups had joined the Northern Alliance and were moving towards 
Kabul. 
 On 13 November, the Northern Alliance had reached the outskirts of the 
city as the Taliban abandoned Kabul.  In just three days, through a combination 
of Northern Alliance ground assaults and American airpower, the anti-Taliban 
force had gone from owning 15 percent of Afghanistan to overrunning over 50 
percent of the country.  By 7 December 2001, the last Taliban stronghold in the 
south, Kandahar, fell to the Northern Alliance and its Pashtun allies.  The 
Taliban, while still active in small bands, no longer politically or militarily 
controlled any major territory in Afghanistan.229  On 22 December 2001, after 
strenuous negotiations between the various anti-Taliban factions in Germany, 
Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the new leader of Afghanistan. 
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 In May 2001, after the overthrow of the Taliban regime was complete, 
Secretary Rumsfeld was asked what the war in Afghanistan meant to him and for 
the Pentagon.  He answered that Afghanistan was proof the Defense Department 
had “fashioned a new defense strategy.  It is a strategy that is more appropriate 
for the 21st century than what we had, we believed.”230  In all, the American 
commitment up to December 2001 for Operation Enduring Freedom that had 
successfully overthrown the Taliban regime and destroyed Al Qaeda’s terrorist 
training camps in Afghanistan used only air strikes and a total of 110 CIA officers 
and 316 Special Forces personnel on the ground.231  It seemed that President 
Bush had gotten his RMA and a new lease on American power for a relatively 
cheap price. 
 
C. AFGHANISTAN’S LEGACY: THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD 
The Secretary of Defense interpreted the success of the Afghanistan war 
as confirmation of the potential of military Transformation.232  President Bush 
also implied that the victory indicated a new level of possibility for the use of 
American power; a promise that if capitalized upon could “achieve big goals… 
[and] there is nothing bigger than to achieve world peace.”233  The success of 
Operation Enduring Freedom - brought about by the combination of precession 
strikes, special operations forces, and coalition warfare - showed a potential for 
economy of force and efficiency in the operational art as yet unseen.  It 
accomplished the objectives of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying 
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the Al-Qaeda training infrastructure that had operated with impunity for nearly a 
decade at a very low cost to the United States, considering the scope of the 
goals.  The accomplishment was even more a remarkable given the history of the 
location, the geography, and the environmental conditions that American 
planners and operators had worked with.  It also suggested that American 
national power had reached a point where the interagency process – in this case, 
close cooperation between the military, State, and the CIA – could work in an ad 
hoc manner and still produce remarkable operational success. 
In fact, when the Secretary of Defense told General Tommy Franks to 
update the war plan for Iraq, he told him to use Operation Enduring Freedom as 
an example.234  However, the problem with this approach was that the conditions 
that characterized Afghanistan were unique to that particular theater.  While the 
precision strikes conducted by American airpower and the target spotting done 
by U.S. Special Forces was extremely important, the critical part on the ground 
was the effort by the CIA operatives to build the vital coalition between the United 
States, the Northern Alliance, and the Pashtun factions by bribing Afghani groups 
to either stay neutral or actively assist in the fighting against the Taliban.  This 
provided the United States with a mercenary ground force in which casualties 
were less of an issue than would have been the case if the force had been solely 
American.  In Bush at War, Bob Woodward points out that this approach, while 
minimizing U.S. casualties, also limited American post-war options because each 
Afghani faction “had [its] own issues, endgames, ambitions, and internal power 
plays” that ultimately affected the end state of the mission.235    
After the fall of Kandahar, peace was largely dependant on Afghani 
desires, not on American visions for a united Afghanistan.  Also, even with the 
Taliban out of power, the fighting in Afghanistan continued at a lower level.  
Additionally, the level of long-term commitment by the United States and the 
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international community remained high even after the Taliban overthrow, pointing 
to force requirements in post-conflict environments that military Transformation 
was not designed to address.236  Despite a December 2001 statement against 
nation-building in Afghanistan by President Bush, four years later Afghanistan 
still had a sizable NATO security force protecting Kabul, the U.N. providing 
economic and political assistance to weak Afghani government institutions, and a 
sizable American military presence hunting for Osama bin Laden,.237  This failure 
to assess real post-conflict concerns outside of the RMA framework would 
become evident in the aftermath of the American capture of Baghdad.238 
In fact, it remained to be seen whether Enduring Freedom represented a 
foundation upon which the U.S. military could build a “new defense strategy.”239  
While the advances in precision strike, network capabilities, and joint cooperation 
point to a quantum improvement over past American capabilities, the war in 
Afghanistan was, in fact, a proxy war - a conflict playing to the strengths of the 
United States.240  Most of the fighting and dying on the ground was done by 
Afghani substitutes for U.S. ground forces while the United States contributed 
with arms, money, and force multipliers such as precision strikes – both air and 
                                            
236 Since the invasion of Iraq and the fight against the insurgency, the U.S. military has put 
new emphasis on civil affairs functions and on greater language training. 
237 On 13 November, President Bush said that “the U.S. forces will not stay.  We don’t do 
police work… We’ve got a job to do on Al Qaeda.  We need to look at Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) targets.”  Woodward, 310.  However, despite that pledge, in 2006 NATO 
provided forces for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with 8,000 troops from 36 
NATO, 9 partner and 2 non-NATO/non-partner countries (the American commitment accounted 
for 89 personnel).  From the NATO: Afghanistan Home Page.  Online at http://www.nato.int/ 
issues/ afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm (16 June 2006).  The UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides support to the Afghani government through a staff of nearly 1000 
personnel, of whom 80 percent are Afghan nationals.  Its goals are focused on the “establishment 
of strong and sustainable Afghan institutions… of good governance, of law and order, and of 
security.”  From the UNAMA Home Page.  Available online at http://www.nato.int /issues/ 
afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm (16 June 2006).  In July 2004, U.S. military forces in 
Afghanistan reached 17,900, though by 2006 the numbers started dropping in anticipation of a 
greater NATO role.  Lisa Burgess, ”U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan at 17,900, and expected 
to hold steady,” Stars and Stripes, 9 July 2004.  Available online at http://www.globalsecurity 
.org/org/news/2004 /040709-afghan-presence.htm (16 June 2006). 
238 Rowan Scarborough writes about obtaining a copy of a the Pentagon’s plan for the 
reconstruction of Iraq in January 2003.  He suggests that it failed to address the need for a 
sizable American force to maintain order in Baghdad and actually envisioned immediate troop 
withdrawals after the Saddam regime was overthrown.  Scarborough, 46-48. 
239 Woodward, 321. 
240 Rumsfeld also characterized the war in Afghanistan as a “proxy” war.  Scarborough, 30. 
77 
ground.  In truth, while the American commitment did provide valuable help in 
breaking the stalemate on the frontlines before winter set in, it was only an 
adjunct to the main Northern Alliance and Pashtun ground efforts.  This American 
strategy followed in the footsteps of most successful American foreign wars, with 
someone else shouldering the lion’s share of ground casualties and the United 
States providing material assistance and force multipliers.241 
Secretary Rumsfeld, however, interpreted the U.S.-led overthrow of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan as a vindication of his vision for military Transformation.  
On 21 January 2002, just months after the fall of the last Taliban stronghold, he 
gave a speech crediting Transformation-inspired planning with the military’s 
ability to integrate Afghanistan-specific operational conditions, such as the use of 
cavalry, with American technology and doctrines to produce the winning 
strategy.242  The combination of Afghani cavalry with U.S. precision bombing and 
networked tactical air control “showed that a revolution in military affairs is about 
more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It's 
also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.”243  The Secretary of 
Defense expanded on this theme a year later in his 2003 Transformation 
Planning Guidance, declaring that the United States needed “fundamentally joint, 
network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and 
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massed effects across the battlespace.  Realizing these capabilities will require 
transforming our people, processes, and military forces.”244 
Secretary Rumsfeld also listed several important lessons he thought the 
United States needed to draw from the war in Afghanistan to plan for the future.  
Among the eight he listed were the importance of “jointness,” the obligatory nod 
to the importance of integrating all elements of national power, and a caution 
about the necessity to be honest with the public245  However, he included one 
important new point: 
Defending the U.S. requires prevention, self-defense and 
sometimes preemption. It is not possible to defend against every 
conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable location at every 
minute of the day or night. Defending against terrorism and other 
emerging 21st century threats may well require that we take the 
war to the enemy. The best, and in some cases, the only defense, 
is a good offense.246 
A little over five months later, President Bush would echo Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s point about preemption in a policy address at the U.S. Military 
Academy graduation on 1 June 2002.   He said, “If we wait for threats to 
materialize, we will have waited too long.”247  Furthermore, the President stated 
to ensure “our security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive 
action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives.”248   
When the Bush administration released the National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America (September 2002), it formalized the possibility of 
American preemptive military action.249   What was remarkable about this new 
                                            
244 Donald Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance (2003) (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, April 2003)  Available online at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/ 
library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_Guidance_April_2003_1.pdf (16 June 
2006). 
245 Rumsfeld.  “21st Century Transformation,” 31 January 2002. 
246 Ibid. 
247 George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point, United States Military Academy, 
West Point, New York, 1 June 2002.  Available online at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ 
official_docs/pres/bush_wp_prestrike.pdf. 
248 Ibid. 
249 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
September 2002 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), ii and15. 
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policy was not that it signaled a change in perception of America’s military power 
– presidential administrations characterizations of U.S. military power had 
remained consistent since George Bush’s 1992 national security strategy.250  
What was remarkable was that it signaled a new belief that both American 
military power – unparalleled possibly for the first time since the United States’ 
monopoly on atomic weapons and American prestige, as the sole global 
superpower on the international stage could be used a manner that would not 
have been conceivable a decade earlier.251 
This perception of unchallenged American power held by the Bush 
administration – in sharp contrast to the views of the Nixon, Carter or even 
Reagan administrations – can be seen repeatedly in administration statements 
and policy throughout the run-up to the 2002 invasion of Iraq.  Even while 
reviewing the Iraqi war plan in January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated to 
General Tommy Franks, CENCTOM commander, his view that “American 
military power, propelled by great advances in precision weapons, was ten times 
stronger than it had been in 1991.”252  When General Shinseki gave his opinion 
in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Iraqi invasion and 
occupation would take “something on the order of several hundred thousand 
                                            
250 Following the shift in perception about American power from peer (with the Soviets) to 
unchallenged (after the 1991 Gulf War) between the Reagan and Bush presidencies, Clinton 
continued to reiterate the characterization of American military preeminence throughout his 
administration.  His final national security strategy in 2000 repeated this view: “As we enter the 
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Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000 (Washington, DC: The 
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soldiers,” he was immediately criticized by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz as being “wildly off the mark."253 
The Bush administration’s view seemed to hold no place for doctrines that 
acknowledged limitations on American power.  In the short span of 20 years, 
American perception of either decline or parity had transformed into a belief of 
unchallenged strength.  In a world where enemies relied on terrorism and where 
U.S. forces were undergoing a Transformation process taking advantage of 
network-centric thinking, precision bombing and expeditionary concepts to build 
unrivaled military capabilities, the Weinberger-Powell seemed to be irrelevant.254  
Instead of a world where the U.S. military had to engage in Active Defense on 
the plains of Central Europe to stop a massive Soviet threat, Pentagon 
strategists saw a new ability to “swiftly defeat” enemies due to an ongoing RMA 
that had been transforming America’s military capabilities since 1973.  American 
perception of the three-decade long Transformation of U.S. military power 
changed the nature of what was view as possible by policymakers in terms of the 
use of force.  This new perception put the U.S. military on the road to Baghdad in 
2002. 
 
                                            
253 Shinseki comment from Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The 
Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 522.  
Wolfowitz comment from Peter Spiegel, “Wolfowitz rebukes army's top officer,” Financial Times, 
28 February 2003,, 1. 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
A. THE ROAD FROM SAIGON TO BAGHDAD 
The U.S. military, as a tool of national power is only as effective as the 
strategy for which it is used.  When Caspar Weinberger introduced his six tests 
for the use of force in 1984, the Reagan administration was contending not only 
with the residue of the Vietnam War but also with what seemed to be an active 
Soviet attempt to destabilize the Third World.   Additionally, U.S. military failure 
such as the 1975 Mayagüez debacle, the 1980 Desert One mission, and the 
1983 Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon undermined American prestige and 
confidence in its armed forces.  The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was the 
Secretary of Defense’s (and later Chairman Powell’s) attempt to bring policy 
objectives in line with what appeared to be the limits of American military power.   
In the past two decades, however, the premise behind the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine, that military power has limits in its ability to support diplomacy, 
has been eroded by the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and an increase in 
American military capabilities brought about by technical and doctrinal innovation 
since 1973.  At the same time the demise of the Soviet Union has not only freed 
the international community, led by the United States, to deal the ethnic conflicts 
and humanitarian disasters, but also forced the military services to look to 
missions beyond actual combat.  The increased demand for military intervention, 
the competition for shrinking budgets, and the ability to achieve greater precision 
in the use of force have all contributed to undermining the Weinberger- Powell 
Doctrine’s purpose. 
This thesis has demonstrated that there has been significant change 
between 1981 and 2003 in how policymakers view American military power.  The 
Executive branch’s perception of the state of American military power as 
changed from characterizing its as in “decline” when compared to a peer (as 
described in President Reagan’s 1988 national security strategy) to being 
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regarded as “unchallenged” in the Bush 2002 national security strategy.255  At 
the same time, military innovations since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, such as 
Arthur K. Cebrowski’s network-centric warfare concept and improvements in 
precision bombing technology, have created a high degree of confidence in the 
tools of American military power in both civilian policymakers and the U.S. 
military. 
This change in perceptions of the potency of military force has in turn led 
policymakers since the 1991 Gulf War to believe it has more utility in supporting 
American diplomacy.  Immediately after the war, the new Clinton administration 
discarded Weinberger’s caution on using force in only circumstances where vital 
American interests were threatened, leading to National Security Advisors 
Anthony Lake’s 1993 speech outlining a broad list of possible humanitarian and 
non-war related interventions for U.S. armed forces.256  Despite Colin Powell’s 
continued efforts throughout both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations to restrain this view, perceptions of limitations on the utility and 
potency of American military force continued to change up to 2003.  
The increased belief in the utility and potency of American military 
capabilities has led policymakers to pursue greater policy objectives with the use 
of force.  Ideas such as the “Five Rings” system model and precision strike not 
only promise the ability to selectively target only specific enemy centers of gravity 
but also to produce predictable effects.257  This seems a repudiation of not only 
the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, as well as Clausewitz’s Trinitarian view of war, 
because historically it has been difficult to concentrate on only one element of a 
                                            
255 Reagan, The 1988 National Security Strategy, 1.  George W. Bush, The 2002 National 
Security Strategy, ii. 
256 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."  Remarks at Johns Hopkins University 
School of Advanced International Studies. 
257 Warden, Jack A. III.  “Air Theory for the 21st Century,” Available online at http://www. 
airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html (16 June 2006). 
83 
society at war at the exclusion of the other two.258  Since the 1990 invasion of 
Panama through the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American policymakers have used 
large-scale military force with less restraint than they did in the Cold War.  This 
willingness to use force in more circumstances is due both to the new nature of 
the international system after the end of the Cold War as well as because military 
technology and doctrines have promised the ability to limit the scope of violence 
and still achieve successful results. 
 It is true that the world has changed dramatically since Secretary 
Weinberger first published the Weinberger Doctrine.  The Cold War has ended 
and the spread of globalization has brought the United States into conflict with a 
new ideological enemy.  GWoT is forcing the United States to reconsider old 
strategic ideas such as preventative war and pre-emptive attack as well as to 
reexamine the role of deterrence and limited war. The ability to identify what 
constitutes vital interests is made even more difficult in the aftermath of the 9/11 
tragedy.  However, as the 2003 war in Iraq has shown, the use of force is only as 
effective as the strategy for which it is used.  The war in Iraq also shows, despite 
the potential the Pentagon’s Transformation agenda holds, there are still very 
real limitations on the utility of U.S. military force. 
 
B. THE FUTURE OF THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE 
 Despite some critics’ belief that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is either 
too restrictive or outdated in today’s global environment, most accept certain 
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elements as remaining valid.259  The truth of the matter is that the United States 
has neither the will nor the ability to act unilaterally and engage every regional 
conflict or humanitarian crisis.   It is also true that as the U.S. military continues 
down the path of the Pentagon’s Transformation agenda its ability to perform 
certain tasks - such as bomb with greater accuracy or share a more common 
operating picture among its various battlefield elements - becomes more efficient 
and effective.  However, in a post-Cold War era characterized by both 
globalization and the threat of terrorism, it must be recognized that the United 
States has responsibilities which may require the use of force in situations where 
the threat is less than of vital national interest. However, instead of scrapping the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, it should be possible to modify its criteria so that 
American policymakers retain the option to use military force in these situations 
while, at the same time, remaining aware of the limitations of military power. 
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless it is in the 
nation’s vital interest or in the vital interest of our allies.  When Caspar 
Weinberger wrote his doctrine, the United States was recovering from a long 
series of military misadventures.  U.S. military power was beginning a slow 
recovery that would take another half decade before American military 
institutions would redeem themselves.260  Weinberger’s “vital interests” 
prescription aimed to prevent the relapse into failure at a pivotal period in 
America’s military recovery.   
Today, policymakers recognize both that the international order and the 
U.S. military are much different than they were in Weinberger’s time, as is the 
threat facing the United States.  The need to focus U.S. military power in limited 
                                            
259 Anthony Lake believed that the vital interest test was valid, but held that it needed to be 
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ways is necessary both to meet American obligations to the international 
community and to protect the nation.   The focus, however, of American interests 
should be on the clearly identified political objectives in any particular 
situation.261  The use or threat of force should concentrate on the vital point of 
whether military force can accomplish the policy goals at an acceptable price.  If 
policymakers determine that the cost is too great, then they should use some 
other combination of national power.262  
When the decision to commit troops to combat is made, it should be done 
with the purpose to win.  This means that the size of the force committed should 
be large enough to ensure victory.  The “overwhelming force” prescription 
continues to give critics pause.  However, this test remains valid, because all it 
requires is to ensure that the means match the ends that policymakers wish to 
achieve.  If American policymakers decide to use or to threaten the use of force, 
it remains incumbent upon them to have done the calculations needed to ensure 
that the United States uses the necessary force and has the reserve of national 
will to accomplish the objectives.  Neither hope nor bluff is sufficient as an 
operational plan, not when the cost of failure is American or non-combatant life.  
The failure in Lebanon occurred because Secretary Schultz and his supporters 
never matched the means needed for success with the policy objectives.  The 
United States committed a force too small and never showed the national will to 
make non-compliance sufficiently costly for either the Israelis or Syrians to 
understand withdrawal was the only option.  Because the Reagan administration 
committed insufficient means to achieve the objective, the United States failed to 
present a credible threat to either party which ultimately led to the loss of both 
credibility and American lives.  
Any commitment of troops to combat must be to achieve clearly defined 
political and military objectives.  This is perhaps the most important consideration 
of Weinberger’s tests.  Clausewitz’s maxim about war being a continuation of 
policy by other means makes it incumbent on policymakers to understand not 




only the objectives they wish to achieve but also the cause-effect relationship 
between the means and the ends.263   Without a clear policy objective, military 
planners may resort to tactical or operational solutions that have no relation to 
the strategic end result policymakers desire.  By the same token, unless 
policymakers understand the relationship between the political and military 
objectives, they may provide too few resources to military planners to ensure that 
a policy can succeed. 
The relationship between the objectives and the forces committed must be 
constantly monitored and adjusted as necessary with changing conditions.  This 
is the safety valve built into Weinberger’s tests to ensure that they remain flexible 
as conditions change.  As the previous test states, any commitment of U.S. force 
must be to achieve clearly defined political and military objectives.  No situation is 
static – all environments change.  If conditions change sufficiently to warrant a 
change in policy objectives, as they did in Lebanon in 1983 and in Somalia in 
1992, then it is logical that there should be a reevaluation of the commitment of 
American military force.  If the policy objective is no longer worth the cost, then 
forces should be withdrawn.  On the other hand, if the price remains acceptable, 
the commitment should be tailored to meet the new objective. 
The United States should commit troops only if there is a support from the 
American people and Congress.  The validity of this test is obvious.  The United 
States is a federal constitutional republic.  Its policymakers are accountable to 
the American people every election cycle.  Ultimately, the cost of a policy’s 
success and failure is paid for by the American people, so any use of force must 
be undertaken with care.  Frank Carlucci’s once said to Colin Powell, “If this 
operation should suddenly appear on the front pages… would the American 
people say ‘Aren’t they clever little devil’s’ or would [they] say, ‘What a bunch of 
boobs.’”264  This is a simple yet effective test to determine if a use of force would 
be valid and acceptable to both the public and its representatives. 
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Force should be an option of last resort.  Whether Americans like it or not, 
this is an American century.  The international order is one heavily influenced by 
American ideals and preferences.  The United States has successfully worked 
with its allies to establish global conditions for norms and institutions fostering 
cooperation and integration such as in the form of the U.N. and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Even when the United States chooses not to participate in 
some institutions, such as with the International Criminal Court (ICC), its values 
and influence can be seen in the character of these organizations.  In the 
international system created by the United States and the Western powers after 
World War II, the use of force has become the least legitimate exercise of 
national power outside of collective sanction.  While recent administrations have 
found this restrictive, the norm was established for valid reasons and should not 
be lightly violated.  Sometimes force must be used.  However, this test remains a 
valuable rule to ensure that an international order that reflects American values 
remains acceptable to the rest of the world’s sovereign nations. 
Ultimately, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine remains valid because it 
serves to remind policymakers that there are limits to American military power no 
matter how advanced arms become or how clever concepts appear.  Like any 
doctrine it serves as a common starting point for planning and provides a 
common language for policymakers and strategists as they debate a course 
through international crisis or conflict.   As a doctrine it must be both authoritative 
and flexible, providing a firm enough foundation so that American means match 
American objectives while flexible enough to allow for the use of force over a 
broad range of conditions so the United States can both protect itself and meet 
its international obligations.  There are no guarantees of success in any 
undertaking, no matter how well thought out or well planned.  The Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine maximizes the chance that military means match the policy 
objective – meaning that there is less chance for the loss of American prestige or 
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